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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we develop a theoretical farm household model of food crop production and 
marketing decisions, derive testable hypotheses concerning the determinants of these decisions, 
and test these hypotheses, using data on cereal production and marketing collected from a 
nationally representative survey of 7,186 farm households in Ethiopia. Focusing on production 
and marketing decisions for teff and maize, the two most important crops in Ethiopia, we find 
that most producers of these crops are either autarkic or net buyers (especially for maize) and 
that net buyers and autarkic households are poorer in many respects than net sellers. This implies 
that interventions to increase cereal productivity will favorably affect distribution for most 
producers. The econometric analysis shows that increasing production of teff and maize is the 
most important factor contributing to increased sales, and that increased smallholder access to 
roads, land, livestock, farm equipment, and traders is key to enabling increased smallholder 
production and commercialization of these crops.  
Keywords: Smallholder production, commercial behavior, market participation, cereal 
crops, Ethiopia  1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Promoting commercialization of agricultural production is a cornerstone of the rural development and 
poverty reduction strategies of Ethiopia, as well as numerous other developing countries. Policymakers in 
Ethiopia and elsewhere view agricultural commercialization as an essential part of the process of 
agricultural modernization, specialization, and structural transformation of the economy toward more 
rapid and sustainable growth. Past empirical research on smallholder commercialization in developing 
countries generally supports this view, although the impacts of commercialization are dependent on the 
local context and policy environment (von Braun and Kennedy 1994). A review of case studies conducted 
in 10 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America found that commercialization increased household 
incomes in most cases, as a result of increased labor and land productivity on farms as well as increased 
employment opportunities for hired labor (von Braun 1994). In most cases, increased incomes resulting 
from commercialization led to increased food consumption (Bouis 1994) and improved nutrition 
(Kennedy 1994). In cases where incomes, food consumption, and nutrition did not improve, factors such 
as insecure land tenure, gender biases, or policy biases against smallholders often contributed to adverse 
consequences (von Braun and Kennedy 1994). Hence there is a strong case for promoting agricultural 
commercialization while seeking to ensure that the benefits and costs of the process are equitably 
distributed. 
  Considering the importance of agricultural commercialization in agricultural and rural 
development policy in Ethiopia and its potentially strong and favorable impacts on agricultural 
productivity, rural poverty reduction, and food and nutrition security, it is important to understand the 
factors affecting the extent of commercialization in Ethiopia. The driving forces generally behind 
commercialization include population growth and demographic change; urbanization; development of 
infrastructure and market institutions; development of the nonfarm sector and broader economy; rising 
labor opportunity costs; and macroeconomic, trade, and sectoral policies affecting these forces (von 
Braun, Bouis, and Kennedy 1994; Pingali and Rosegrant 1995). At the local level, commercialization is 
also affected by many factors, including agro-climatic conditions and risks; access to markets and 
infrastructure; community and household resource and asset endowments; development of local 
commodity, input, and factor markets; laws and institutions; and cultural and social factors affecting 
consumption preferences, production, and market opportunities and constraints (Pender, Ehui, and Place 
2006). These factors influence commercialization by affecting the conditions of commodity supply and 
demand, output and input prices, and transaction costs and risks faced by farmers, traders, and others in 
the agricultural production and marketing system.  2 
Since the early 1990s, several articles in the literature have modeled the effects of transaction 
costs on agricultural supply and marketing response (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991; Goetz 
1992; Omamo 1998a, 1998b; Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja 2004). 
The essential insight of these analyses is that transaction costs lead to three distinct production and 
marketing regimes for a particular commodity: sellers, buyers, and autarkic households. Proportional 
transaction costs (costs such as transportation and handling that are proportional to the amount being 
transacted) increase the price paid by buyers and reduce the price received by sellers, similar to the effect 
of a sales tax. Fixed transaction costs (costs that do not depend upon the amount transacted, such as costs 
of searching for and screening potential buyers or sellers, negotiating the transaction, and enforcing the 
terms of the agreement) do not directly affect the incentive price but affect whether a household will find 
it advantageous to buy or sell any amount, requiring a minimum scale of transaction (Key, Sadoulet, and 
de Janvry 2000).
1  The incentive price faced by producers depends upon which regime they are in, with 
sellers facing the lowest price and buyers the highest price. Since many smallholder farmers are buyers of 
food crops (Omamo 1998a, 1998b; Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja 2004) and sellers or potential sellers 
of cash crops (crops intended primarily for sale, not for domestic consumption), they face greater 
incentive to continue producing food crops and less incentive to produce cash crops than if transaction 
costs were lower (Omamo 1998a, 1998b). Thus, the impacts of investments in infrastructure, 
development of marketing institutions, or other measures intended to reduce transaction costs will also 
depend upon the type of commodities that farmers are producing or may produce. 
Although these studies have contributed many important new insights about farmers’ 
commercialization behavior and the effects of transaction costs on agricultural supply response, they do 
not address several other important factors affecting production and marketing decisions of smallholder 
farmers in developing countries, such as production and marketing risks, intra-annual credit and liquidity 
constraints, and the timing of production and marketing decisions (Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000; 
Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja 2004). In addition, these studies do not derive testable hypotheses from 
the theories presented concerning the expected impacts of many of the underlying factors influencing 
                                                 
1 One may question whether many of these costs are actually fixed if one considers multiple transactions occurring over a 
marketing season. Although fixed for each transaction, if a farmer conducts multiple small transactions in a season, with the size 
of each transaction possibly limited by the amount of produce the farmer is able to carry to the market, some of these “fixed 
costs” may turn out to be roughly proportional to the total amount transacted over the season. On the other hand, there may be 
other costs that are fixed for an entire season (such as the cost of renting a stall at the market for the season) or startup investment 
costs that must be incurred the first time the farmer produces or markets a commodity that he or she has not produced or 
marketed before (such as costs of specialized production, storage, or transport equipment; of learning how to produce or market 
the commodity; of establishing connections with buyers; and of certification in the case of certified niche market commodities). 
Startup investment costs are likely to be particularly important constraints to diversification into new cash commodities, 
especially in the context of the irreversible nature of many such investments, uncertainty, and liquidity constraints (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994; Fafchamps and Pender 1997). Distinguishing such different types of “fixed costs,” their implications for 
commercialization, and the role of policy and program interventions in addressing the constraints that these pose to 
commercialization likely would be valuable avenues for future research.  3 
commercialization, other than transaction costs, or use such hypotheses to interpret the empirical results 
presented.  
In this paper, we contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature on determinants of 
commercialization of food crop production by developing two versions of a theoretical agricultural 
household model of food production, consumption, and marketing (without and with binding credit 
constraints) and deriving the testable implications of the model in terms of the exogenous factors in the 
model. These implications are tested using a structural econometric model that is derived explicitly from 
the theory, using data on Ethiopian farm households’ net market position, production, and marketing 
decisions (sales or purchases) and the factors influencing these decisions. The data were collected using a 
nationally representative household survey of 7,186 households during 2005. In the econometric analysis, 
we focus on production and marketing of teff and maize, which are the two most important crops grown 
in Ethiopia in terms of area planted and value of production (CSA 2005). The focus on food crops leads to 
a model with three distinct marketing regimes, as in the models of Goetz (1992); Key, Sadoulet, and de 
Janvry (2000); and Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja (2004), which would not be the case for cash crops 
(since production of such crops is primarily for sale). Although the decision to produce cash versus food 
crops is also an important issue in agricultural commercialization, it is not the decision faced by most 
smallholder producers in Ethiopia, and we do not address it in this paper. 
As in much of the previous literature on this topic, cited above, the theoretical model developed is 
deterministic; hence it does not consider the implications of production and marketing risks. A 
deterministic model was chosen to make derivation of model implications tractable and not because this 
assumption is particularly realistic in the Ethiopian context. We believe, however, that adequately 
understanding the deterministic model is an essential first step to modeling the more complex situation 
with production and marketing risks, and that many of the insights from the deterministic case will carry 
over to the stochastic case, with some modifications.
2  Another limitation of the study is that the empirical 
work is based on data collected during one year only. Households may change their marketing decisions 
from one year to the next depending on production and market conditions, and we are unable to address 
this in this study. Such limitations may be addressed in future work building upon this study. Despite 
                                                 
2 For example, incorporating production risk during the preharvest period would cause producers to consider the 
probabilities of the marketing regimes that they may be in during the second period, considering their subjective perceptions of 
the probability distribution of the exogenous factors affecting production (such as  rainfall and pests) and the effects of their 
preharvest decisions (such as  input use). Thus, instead of using certain knowledge of the marketing regime to determine their 
preharvest decisions, producers would optimally take into account the likelihood of each regime occurring, as well as the 
incentives existing under each of those. Without price or marketing risks, the second (postharvest) period of the model would be 
the same whether or not production risks were incorporated. Incorporating price and marketing risks would reduce the expected 
utility from relying on the market (for risk-averse households), leading to a greater tendency for autarky (similar to the effect of 
larger transaction costs), as well as affecting production and marketing behavior of market participants. 4 
these limitations, we believe that this study contributes substantially to improved understanding of the 
factors affecting smallholder commercialization of food crops, particularly in Ethiopia. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop the theoretical 
models of smallholder commercialization and derive their implications. In section 3, we derive the 
empirical specification used for the econometric analysis and discuss econometric issues. In section 4, we 
present the data and descriptive results. In section 5, we present and discuss the econometric results, and 
in section 6 we discuss conclusions and implications. 5 
2.  THEORY OF SMALLHOLDER COMMERCIALIZATION OF FOOD PRODUCTION 
Model 
We consider a farm household that consumes two commodities, food (Cft) and nonfood (Cnt) goods during 
two periods (t = 1 and t = 2), the preharvest and postharvest seasons, providing utility determined by a 
quasi-concave utility function (U), which we assume to be additively separable between periods 1 and 2: 
f1n 1f 2n 2 1f 1n 1 2f 2n 2 U ( C,  C,  C,  C)  =  U ( C,  C)  +  U ( C,  C) .  
We assume that Cft and Cnt are normal goods. The household produces the food commodity (Yf), 
using inputs of labor (Lf), other variable inputs (X), and the services of productive quasi-fixed capital 
stocks (K), with production determined by the production function: Yf = F(K, Lf, X). We assume that the 
production function is constant returns to scale, concave, increasing in each factor, and twice 
differentiable; that inputs Lf and X are normal inputs; and that the marginal productivity of each input is 
not reduced by the other (FLX = FXL ≥ 0).
3 The household has an endowment of family labor Lt, which we 
assume is inelastically supplied in each period.
4  Besides working on farm, the household can hire labor 
out (Lot) at wage rate wt, where t indexes the season. The household earns exogenous income (Tt) in each 
period.
5   
The price of purchased inputs is px and the market prices of food and nonfood items in each 
period are pft and pnt, respectively. Food purchases (Pft) and sales (Sft) are subject to proportional 
transaction costs of tbt and tst, respectively. We ignore transaction costs in purchasing nonfood goods and 
variable inputs and in obtaining off-farm employment, as these can be considered as part of pnt, px, and wt. 
The household may borrow cash in the preharvest period (B1) and repay the lender (1+r1)B1 in the 
postharvest period.  
The household’s decision problem is to maximize U(Cf1, Cn1,Cf2, Cn2), subject to the following 
constraints: 
                                                 
3 In our notation, a partial derivative is denoted by a subscript. For example, “U1f” means ∂U1/∂C1f, “FL” means ∂F/∂Lf, 
“FLX” means ∂
2F/∂Lf∂X, and so forth. The assumption of nonnegative cross partial derivatives of F holds if F is a constant 




1/ρ], since it can be shown that the sign of the 
cross-partial derivatives is equal to the sign of 1 –ρ, and ρ≤1 for the CES production function. This assumption also holds for the 
cases of Cobb-Douglas and linear production functions, which are special cases of the CES function.  
4 We make the assumption that labor is inelastically supplied to increase the tractability and reduce the presentational 
complexity of the model. Most of the qualitative predictions of the model are similar if leisure is included in the utility function. 
We discuss areas in which the results would differ (mainly relating to off-farm labor supply) in our discussion of model 
implications. 
5 The value of initial stocks of liquid assets, including food stocks, can be considered part of T1. 6 
Budget constraints in each period:  
  111 1 1 1 11 1 () fb f n n x o p tC p C p X w L BT +++ ≤ + + , and                  (B1) 
  2 22 2 2 2 1 1 22 22 2 () ( 1 ) () fb f n n fs f p tP p C r B p tS w LT +++ + ≤ −+ + . (B2) 
Food supply constraints in each period: 
11 f f CP ≤ , and         (F1) 
  22 2 (, ,) f ff f CSF K L X P + ≤+ . (F2) 
Nonfood supply constraints in each period: 
nt nt CP ≤ , t = 1, 2.  (N1 and N2) 
Labor supply constraint in each period: 
  1 1 fo LLL + ≤ , and  (L1) 
  2 2 o LL ≤ . (L2) 
Credit constraint: 
  1 1 B B ≤ .  (C1) 
We also assume that nonnegativity constraints hold in all periods for all decision variables (Cft, Cnt, Lf, Lot, 
X, Pft, Sft, Pnt, B1). In the case of consumption and production inputs, we assume that the marginal utilities 
and marginal products for zero use are sufficiently large relative to prices that positive amounts are 
always demanded. In the case of purchase and sales of food and borrowing, corner solutions are possible. 
  Except for the credit constraint, all of the constraints above will hold as equalities at the optimum 
since, otherwise, not all resources would be used; that is, utility could be increased by using more factors 
and increasing consumption. For the credit constraint, we assume initially that this constraint is not 
binding and derive the first-order conditions for the unconstrained case. We then consider the constrained 
borrowing case, imposing C1 as an equality.  
  The first-order conditions for this problem are as follows.
6 









=  (1) 
                                                 
6 In the first-order conditions, a partial derivative is denoted by a subscript. For example, “U1f” means ∂U1/∂C1f, “FL” means 
∂F/∂Lf, and so forth  7 
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These first-order conditions plus the constraints specified earlier determine the household’s 
optimum choice of the decision variables. The assumptions made on preferences and opportunities assure 
that the solution to the first-order conditions exists and is an optimum. 
Implications 
Several interesting implications can be derived from this model. 
Marketing Regimes in Period 2 
As with the models of Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) and Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja (2004), 
transaction costs imply the existence of three distinct marketing regimes for food. It is straightforward to 
show from equations (4a) to (5b) that the household will not both purchase and sell food in the same 8 
period, and that there is a range of the shadow price for food in which the household is autarkic. 
Equations (4a) and (5a) imply that for a positive amount of both food purchases and sales in period 2, the 
following condition must hold: 
2
22 2 2 2
2
f





= −= +,   










































== −≤ ≤ + Æ Household is autarkic in period 2.   (7c) 
Thus, the relationship between the shadow price of food in period 2 (pn2U2f/U2n) in autarky and 
the farm-level price net of transaction costs determines the choice of regime.  
Production Incentives for Market Participants 
The incentive to use labor and other variable inputs in food production in period 1 depends upon what 
marketing regime the household is in during period 2. Assuming that the household is a seller in period 2 
and that borrowing is unconstrained in period 1, one can show, using equations (2), (3), (5a), and (6a) that 
























     (8b) 
Equations (8a) and (8b) are the usual conditions for profit-maximizing input use, with the output 
price adjusted by the transaction cost and discounted to the first period by the interest rate (r1). Thus, the 
presence of proportional transaction costs does not affect the separable household model result of profit 
maximization for a household that is selling its output, as long as credit is not constrained. Similarly, for a 
























    (9b) 9 
Note that FL and FX will be less for the buying household than for the selling household, which 
implies that a buyer will use more inputs and obtain higher production than a seller if both households 
have the same production function and productive capital (K). Of course, differences in access to 
technology and capital are important reasons for differences in marketing regime, but such differences in 
regime choice may also arise from differences in household demand conditions (such as household size 
and composition). The point here is that sellers face a lower incentive price than buyers. Autarkic 
households face an incentive price (their shadow price) between that of buyers and sellers and thus have 
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     (10b) 
These relationships refute the notion that commercialization (in the sense of producing for sale) 
increases farmers’ incentive to use inputs in production. Quite the contrary, their incentive to use inputs is 
reduced. However, it may be that commercialization increases farmers’ ability to use purchased inputs 
when credit constraints are binding. We take up the issue of credit constraints below. 
These relationships also demonstrate that the farmer’s incentive to produce does not depend upon 
whether he is a “net” seller or buyer, as is sometimes asserted. If he is a seller in period 2, the selling price 
in that period minus transaction costs, discounted to period 1, is his incentive price, regardless of how 
much he purchases in period 1. Thus, it is irrelevant whether he purchases enough in period 1 to be a net 
seller or net buyer over the entire year.  
Note that for a selling household, reducing the transaction cost increases its incentive price, 
leading to greater use of inputs and greater production. For a buying household, by contrast, a reduction in 
transaction costs reduces its production incentive, use of inputs, and production. However, in both cases, 
the household is better off as a result of the reduced transaction costs. This emphasizes that it is important 
not to equate impacts on production or commercialization with impacts on household welfare, as these 
effects may be quite different. For autarkic households, a reduction in transaction costs has no effect 
unless the change is large enough to cause them to become buyers or sellers. The impacts on production 
will depend on whether the household becomes a buyer or seller (more production if it becomes a seller, 
less if it becomes a buyer), although again the impacts on welfare will be positive in both cases. 
Other factors influencing production incentives of market participants include the market prices 
of the food commodity (pf2), purchased inputs (pX), the opportunity cost of labor (w1), the interest rate (r1), 
and the household’s endowment of productive capital (K). Households that are sellers or buyers behave as 
profit maximizers (subject to the relevant price for food, taking transaction costs into account) and the 
standard results for the impacts of these variables apply. For example, an increase in pf2 or a decrease in r1 10 
increases the incentive to use inputs; hence it increases use of labor, inputs, and food production (Table 
1). An increase in px (or w1) reduces use of both purchased inputs, labor, and food production.
7  An 
increase in K increases the marginal productivity of purchased inputs and labor; hence it results in 
increased use of these inputs and increased food production. Changes in nonfood prices, the food price in 
the first period, the household’s labor endowment, exogenous income, or other exogenous factors do not 
affect the production incentives of market participants, as seen by the absence of these factors in 
equations (8a) and (8b) and (9a) and (9b). Such factors do affect the production incentives of autarkic 
households, however, by affecting the shadow price of food. We will consider the autarky case, after 
considering impacts of exogenous factors on consumption, marketing, and borrowing behavior of market 
participants.  
Consumption, Marketing, and Borrowing Incentives of Market Participants 
The effects of changes in commodity prices on consumption and marketing decisions of market 
participants have been derived elsewhere (Strauss 1984; Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986). For a 
household that both produces and consumes a commodity (such as food in our model), the effects of a 
change in the price of that commodity are given by 









=+ −      (11) 
where Cj refers to consumption of the jth good (Cf1, Cn1, Cf2, and Cn2 in our model) and dCj/dI refers to the 
effect of a change in income on demand for the jth good, which is positive in our model, since we assume 
all goods are normal goods. The term dCj/dpf2|U refers to the effect on compensated demand (holding 
utility constant) of a change in the price of food, which will be negative for Cf2. If the other commodities 
are net substitutes for Cf2, an increase in the price of Cf2 leads to an increase in the compensated demand 
for the other goods.
8  In this case, equation (11) implies that an increase in pf2 will lead to an increase in 
Cf1, Cn1, and Cn2 if the household is a seller of food (Yf – Cf2 > 0), since both the substitution and income 
effects in equation (11) are positive for these other goods. Conversely, the effect of an increase in pf2 on 
Cf2 is ambiguous for a seller, since the income and substitution effects are in opposite directions. For a 
food-buying household (Yf – Cf2 < 0), the income effect of an increase in the food price is the opposite of 
that for a seller; that is, the household’s real income decreases. As a result, the effect of an increase in pf2 
on Cf2 is unambiguously negative for a food buyer, while the effect on consumption of other goods is 
ambiguous. 
                                                 
7 The negative own input price effect is a standard result of production theory and results from the concavity of the 
production function. The negative cross-input price effects (for example, that an increase in px reduces Lf) follows from the 
assumption of nonnegative cross-partial derivatives of the production function. In the limiting case in which cross-partial 
derivatives of the production function are zero, the cross-input price effects are also zero. 
8 If there are only two goods, they must be net substitutes (Nicholson 1995, 180). If there are more than two goods, net 
substitution must be the prevalent relationship; that is, ∑i≠j(pidCj/dpi|U) ≥ 0 (Nicholson 1995, 193). 11 
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  A  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ?  ?  0/?  0/?  ?  - 
pn2↑  S/B  0 0 0 0 ? ?  ?  -  0 ?  ? ?  - 
  A  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ?  ?  0/?  0/?  ?  - 
px↑  S/B  - + - - - -  -  -  0  ?
(-)  ?
(+)  ?
(-)  - 
  A  ? ? - - ? ?  -  ?  ?  0/?  0/?  ?  - 
w1↑  S/B  - + - - + + +  +  0 -  + ?  + 
  A  ? ? ? ? +
n  +
n  ? +
n  + 0  0/+  ?  + 
r1↑  S/B  - + - - - -  ?  ?  0 ?  ? -  - 
  A  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  ?  ? ?  ? ?  - 
K↑  S/B  + - + + + + +  +  0 +  - +  + 
  A  + - + + ? ? +  ?  -  0/+  0 ?  + 
L1↑  S/B  0 + 0 0 + + +  +  0 -  + -  + 
  A  + + + + +
n  +
n  + +
n  + 0  0/+  ?  + 
L2↑  S/B  0 0 0 0 + + +  +  0 -  + +  + 
  A  + - + +  +
n  +
n  + +
n  + 0  0/+  +  + 
T1↑  S/B  0 0 0 0 + + +  +  0 -  + -  + 
  A  + - + +  +
n  +
n  + +
n  + 0  0/+  ?  + 
T2↑  S/B  0 0 0 0 + + +  +  0 -  + +  + 
  A  + - + +  +
n  +
n  + +
n  + 0  0/+  +  + 
Symbols:  S = seller, B = buyer, S/B = seller or buyer, A = autarkic 
+ = positive impact, – = negative impact, 0 = no impact, 0/+ = no or positive impact, ? = ambiguous impact 
n means Cf1, Cn1, Cf2, and Cn2 are assumed to be net substitutes for each other for these results. 
(-) means effect is negative if εx,px < -1; 
(+) means effect is positive if εx,px < -1. 12 
Since an increase in pf2 has an ambiguous impact on food consumption of a food-selling 
household, it also has an ambiguous impact on food sales (Sf2) (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986). 
Borrowing (B1) unambiguously increases, however, since increased purchases of inputs, increased on-
farm labor use (hence reduced off-farm labor earnings), and increased consumption of both food and 
nonfood goods in the first period all require increased borrowing to satisfy the first-period budget 
constraint. The welfare of a selling household increases as pf2 increases because the household’s real 
income has increased.  
For a food-buying household, an increase in pf2 reduces food purchases since Yf increases and Cf2 
decreases. The effect on borrowing is ambiguous since the impacts on first-period consumption are 
ambiguous. The welfare of buying households is reduced by an increase in pf2. 
The effects of changes in proportional transaction costs for food are equivalent to changes in the 
household-level price of food. That is, a reduction in the transaction costs faced by sellers (ts2) leads to the 
same effects as an increase in pf2, while a reduction in transaction costs faced by buyers (tb2) leads to the 
same effects as a decrease in pf2. 
The effects of a change in nonfood prices are determined by the normal Slutsky decomposition, 
since households are assumed not to produce the nonfood good: 









=−  (12) 
Equation (12) implies that an increase in the price of nonfood items in period 2 (pn2) will reduce 
Cn2, but it will have ambiguous impacts on Cf2, Cf1, and Cn1, since income and substitution effects are in 
opposite directions for other goods (assuming other goods are net substitutes for Cn1). Impacts on food 
sales or purchases are ambiguous, since impacts on food consumption are ambiguous. Impacts on 
borrowing are ambiguous since impacts on first-period consumption are ambiguous. The household’s 
welfare declines since an increase in nonfood prices reduces real income. 
The effects of an increase in food or nonfood prices in period 1 are analogous to the effects of an 
increase in Cn2. Changes in these prices have no impact on the use of inputs or food production, reduce 
consumption of the good whose price has increased, and have ambiguous effects on consumption of other 
goods. The effects on food sales or purchases are thus ambiguous, as is the effect on borrowing. Increases 
in either of these prices reduce household welfare, since the household is a purchaser of these goods.
  A reduction in transaction costs of purchasing food in the first period (tb1) is equivalent to a 
reduction in the food price faced by the household, and has the same impacts. Note that an improvement 
in access to infrastructure or in market institutions is likely to reduce transaction costs in both periods, and 
the total effects are the combined effects of reducing transaction costs in both periods. 13 
An increase in the price of the purchased input (px) results in less consumption of all goods, since 
this reduces the profit and income of food producers and hence their consumption demands. Since both 
food production and consumption are reduced, the effect on food sales or purchases is ambiguous in 
general. However, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for food sales (Sf2) to decline or food 
purchases (Pf2) to increase as px increases is that the demand elasticity of X with respect to px (εx,px)  be 
less than –1.
9  In this elastic input demand case, borrowing decreases since expenditures on inputs (pxX) 
and Lf decrease (hence Lo1 increases), while Cf1 and Cn1 also decrease, reducing the demand for credit to 
meet the first-period budget constraint. More ambiguous impacts on marketing and borrowing can occur 
if input demand is inelastic. An increase in px reduces the household’s welfare since this reduces its 
income. 
An increase in w1 has the opposite effect of an increase in px on household income, since the 
household is assumed to be a net seller of labor.
10  In this case, since food consumption increases and food 
production decreases, sales must decrease for a food seller and purchases must increase for a food buyer. 
The impact on borrowing is ambiguous since input use declines but first-period consumption and wage 
income increases. Welfare increases since real income has increased. 
                                                 
9 Proof:  To simplify notation, define prices net of transactions costs: pf1
n = pf1+tb1, pf2
n = pf2-ts2 if the household is a 
seller and pf2
n = pf2+tb2 if the household is a buyer. Dividing budget constraint (B2) by 1+r1, adding it to budget 
constraint (B1), substituting for Pft - Sft from constraints (F1) and (F2), and rearranging terms, we obtain the two-
period budget constraint: 
2 2 2 22
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. (13) 
The first four terms on the right side of equation (13) represent the discounted full-endowment income (FEI), and the last 
three terms represent the discounted profit from food crop production (π). We define full income (FI) as FEI+ π. Differentiating 
equation (13) with respect to px and rearranging terms, we obtain 
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(footnote 9 continued) 
Rearranging equation (14), we obtain 
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.         (15) 
Equation (15) implies that d(Yf –Cf2)/dpx < 0 if εx,px ≤ –1. This is a sufficient but not a necessary condition; this result may 
hold even if ε > -1. 
10 Proof:  Differentiate the combined budget constraint (equation (13) in the previous footnote) to obtain: 
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.               (16) 
By the envelope theorem, dπ/dw1 = -Lf. Therefore, the right side of equation (16) equals L1-Lf = Lo1 > 0. Thus the income 
effect of an increase in w1 is positive, and since Cf1, Cn1, Cf2, and Cn2 are all assumed to be normal goods, all increase. Note that if 
the household is a net buyer rather than a net seller of labor, the income effect would be negative and consumption of all goods 
would decrease. This is the same as the case for X. 14 
An increase in r1 results in a reduction in full income, both because this reduces the discounted 
full endowment income and because it reduces the discounted price received for food production (hence 
reduces discounted profit). It also amounts to a reduction in the discounted price of Cf2 and Cn2. Hence, an 
increase in r1 leads to a reduction in both Cf1 and Cn1 because both income and substitution effects are 
acting in this direction for first-period consumption.
11  The effects of r1 on second-period consumption are 
ambiguous since income and substitution effects are in opposite directions.
12  Borrowing in the first 
period declines because consumption, input use, and farm labor use decline (implying that off-farm labor 
use increases), resulting in less demand for credit. Welfare also declines since the increase in the interest 
rate reduces the household’s real income.  
An increase in K increases food production and profits and hence increases Cf1, Cn1, Cf2, and Cn2. 
Although both food production and consumption increase, food production increases by more than food 
consumption in the second period; hence food sales increase if the household is a food seller or food 
purchases decrease if the household is a food purchaser.
13  Borrowing increases because food 
                                                 
11 Proof: Define V1(E1) = max U1(Cf1, Cn1) subject to pf1
nCf1+ pn1Cn1 = E1 and V2(E2) = max U2(Cf2, Cn2) subject to pf2
nCf2+ 
pn2Cn2 = E2. Then the household’s problem is equivalent to maximizing V1(E1)+V2(E2) subject to E1 + E2/(1+r1) = FEI+π, where 











    (17)  
  11 2 1 (1 ) (1 )( ) 0 rE E r F E I π ++ − + + =     (18) 


























    (19) 
The result dE1/dr1 < 0 follows from the concavity of V1 and V2 and the fact that V2 is increasing in E2. Since both Cf1 and Cn1 
are normal goods, consumption of both decline as E1 declines. 
























    (20) 
This expression is of ambiguous sign since the terms in the numerator are positive and negative. 
13 Proof:  Differentiate equation (13) with respect to K to obtain 
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The inequality in (21) results because dX/dK > 0 and dLf /dK > 0, as shown earlier. The left side of equation (21) is greater 
than pf2
n/(1+r1)(dCf2/dK), since dCf1/dK, dCn1/dK, and dCn2/dK are all greater than 0. Hence dCf2/dK < dYf/dK. 15 
consumption and input and farm labor use increase in the first period. Welfare increases because real 
income increases. 
An increase in L1 increases the household’s endowment income; hence Cf1, Cn1, Cf2 and Cn2   
increase. Since production is unaffected by a change in L1 (for a market participant), food sales must 
decline if the household is a food seller, and food purchases must increase if the household is a food 
purchaser. Although consumption increases in the first period, income from off-farm labor increases even 
more, so borrowing decreases.
14  Household welfare increases since real income increases. An increase in 
L2 has similar impacts, except that borrowing increases rather than decreases. This is because first period 
income is not increased in this case, while first-period consumption (and second-period income) 
increases, requiring increased borrowing to shift income to the first period. If both L1 and L2 increase, the 
impacts will be the combined effects of both, resulting in similar qualitative predictions for all variables 
except borrowing, for which the impacts will be ambiguous. 
An increase in T1 has qualitatively similar impacts to a change in L1: it has no effect on input use 
of food production, while consumption of all goods increases, food sales decline or food purchases 
increase, borrowing declines,
15 and welfare increases. An increase in T2 has similar impacts, except that 
borrowing increases, as with an increase in L2.  
Implications for Autarkic Households 
The model implications for autarkic households can be derived from the results for market participants, 
taking the “given” price of food in period 2 as the shadow price (pf2
s), which equates food supply and 
demand: 
  22 2 (, ) (, )
ss
ff f f Yp Z C p Z =    (24) 
where Z is the vector of exogenous variables in the model. Equation (24) determines pf2
s(Z).  
Writing the reduced form for endogenous variable yj when pf2 is exogenously determined as yj(pf2,Z), 
substituting pf2
s(Z) for pf2 in this expression and totally differentiating this by Zi, we obtain the effect of 
any particular exogenous variable (Zi) on any yj: 
                                                 
14 Proof:  Using the first-period budget constraint to solve for B1, and differentiating with respect to L1 (and recalling that 
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Differentiating equation (13) with respect to L1, we obtain: 
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Equations (22) and (23) imply that dB1/dL1 < 0, since dCf2/dL1 and dCn2/dL1 are greater than zero. 
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    (25) 
The first term on the right side of equation (25) is the effect of Zi on yj in the model with 
exogenous (fixed) pf2, and the second term is the effect via the impact of Zi on the shadow price of food. 






















    (26) 
For an autarkic household, equation (11) implies that ∂Cf2/∂pf2 < 0 (since income effects of a food 
price change are zero for autarkic households), while ∂Yf/∂pf2 > 0 as shown earlier. Hence, the sign of the 
denominator in equation (26) is negative, and the sign of dpf2
s/dZi is the same as the sign of ∂(Cf2-Yf)/∂Zi, 
evaluated at the shadow price where equation (24) is satisfied. In other words, if increasing Zi in autarky 
would lead to excess demand for Cf2, the shadow price will increase, and conversely, if increasing Zi leads 
to excess supply, the shadow price will decrease. 
Based on equation (26) and the results in Table 1, we can see that an increase in w1, L1, L2, T1, or 
T2 would lead to an increase in pf2
s, since these changes increase excess food demand by increasing 
household income. Sufficiently large increases in these variables may therefore cause an autarkic 
household to become a food buyer in period 2 (when pf2
s in autarky exceeds the market price) and further 
increases will have the same impacts as those shown in Table 1 for food buying households. An increase 
in K would lead to a decrease in pf2
s by increasing excess supply, and a sufficiently large increase may 
cause the household to become a food seller, with further increases in K leading to the same effects as for 
food sellers. Changes in most other exogenous variables have ambiguous effects on pf2
s since they have 
ambiguous impacts on excess food demand or supply.  
An increase in the market price of food (or reduction in transaction costs) in period 2 has no 
direct effect on the household’s shadow price as long as the household remains in autarky. However, if 
the market price increases enough (or the transaction cost for selling falls enough) so that the net market 
return from selling becomes greater than the household’s shadow price, the household will become a food 
seller (conversely, the household may become a food buyer in period 2 if the market price or transaction 
cost for buying falls substantially). In this case, the effects of a food price increase (decrease) are 
qualitatively similar to those for a food seller (buyer). If transaction costs increase, an autarkic household 
will remain autarkic (if other factors are unchanged). 
Using the above results for impacts on shadow prices, the results in the previous section and 
equation (25), we can show the impacts of changes of some exogenous factors on some endogenous 17 
variables in autarky. For example, an increase in w1 leads to an increase in Cf1, Cn1 and Cn2 (assuming 
these are net substitutes for Cf2) because the increase in w1 increases them, holding pf2 constant, and also 
because this increases the shadow price of food, which increases the consumption of net substitutes for 
Cf2 (income effects of the shadow food price change are zero for autarkic households). The effect of 
increasing w1 on Cf2 and Yf is ambiguous. Essentially, increasing w1 shifts the household’s food demand 
curve out (due to increased income) and the food supply curve in (due to increased costs), resulting in 
ambiguous impacts on food consumption and production, although the shadow price of food 
unambiguously increases. The effects on input use and labor use are ambiguous, since the increase in the 
shadow price of food acts in the opposite direction to the increased price of labor. The effects on 
borrowing are ambiguous because the effects on input use are ambiguous. 
An increase in K increases both the supply of food (by increasing productivity directly and use of 
X and Lf) and the demand for food (by increasing profits from food production, hence income), resulting 
in increased Cf2 and Yf in autarky. The effect on consumption of other goods is ambiguous, since income 
and substitution effects are in opposite directions. As for market participants, the impact of an increase in 
K on off-farm employment is negative, since Lf increases. The impact on borrowing is ambiguous because 
the effects on first-period consumption are ambiguous.  
An increase in L1, L2, T1, or T2 increases the demand for food (by increasing income), while 
having no direct effect on food supply. This leads to an increase in Cf2 in autarky and to an increase in the 
shadow price of food. The increased shadow price of food contributes to increased consumption of other 
goods (assuming they are net substitutes for Cf2) and induces an increase in use of inputs and food 
production to balance the increased demand.  
The effects of these variables on off-farm labor supply (Lo1) differ, however. Since labor used for 
food production increases, off-farm labor (Lo1) decreases in all of these cases except when L1 is increased. 
When L1 is increased, not all of the increased labor endowment is allocated to food production (although 
Lf does increase), since additional cash income is needed to finance increased consumption of other 
goods. Thus, Lo1 increases when L1 is increased.  
The effects of changes in L1, L2, T1, and T2 on borrowing also differ. Increases in L2 or T2 increase 
borrowing, both because the increased income in the second period increases the desire to smooth 
consumption by borrowing (as shown previously), and because the increase in the shadow price of food 
induces increased input use and increased first-period consumption (assuming net substitution), thereby 
increasing demand for credit. In contrast, an increase in L1 or T1 has ambiguous impacts on borrowing, 
because increased income in the first period tends to reduce the demand for credit, while an increase in 
the shadow price of food induces increased input use that tends to increase credit demand. 18 
The effects of changes in other exogenous variables (pf1, pn1, pn2, px, r1) are more difficult to 
prove, because the effects of these variables on excess food supply or demand, and hence upon the 
shadow price of food, are ambiguous. However, it is possible to prove that an increase in px results in a 
reduction in X, Yf, and Cf2 for autarkic households, as for market participants.
16  This is because an 
increase in px results in a shift inward of the food supply curve (that is, an upward shift of the marginal 
cost curve) and an inward shift in the demand for food (due to reduced profit from food production). 
Effects of other changes in exogenous variables are ambiguous.  
Implications of the Labor–Leisure Choice 
If we had assumed that households choose leisure as well as consumption in each period, and that leisure 
is also a normal good, few of the model predictions would change. Two additional first-order conditions 
would be added, equating the implicit value of leisure in each period to the wage rate, similar to the first-
order conditions for consumption goods. A change in the price of any non-leisure good would affect 
leisure in each period in a qualitatively similar way to the impacts on other goods (besides the one whose 
price was changed), since for a household participating in the labor market, leisure acts just the same as a 
consumption good with a price of wt. The main changes in the results in Table 1 would be in the impacts 
on off-farm labor supply (Lo1), which would be ambiguous for a change in pf2 or tb2 if the household is a 
food buyer in period 2, or for a change in pf1, tb1, pn1, pn2, or w1. The impacts on Lo1 are ambiguous in these 
cases because the impacts on leisure in the first period are ambiguous, since income and substitution 
effects are in opposite directions. For example, an increase in pf2 for a food-buying household has a 
negative income effect but a positive substitution effect on first-period leisure (assuming leisure is a net 
substitute for food). Increases in prices of other goods have ambiguous impacts for the same reason. An 
increase in w1 has a positive income effect but a negative substitution effect on leisure demand. 
                                                 
16 Proof:  Suppose that px increases but the household does not decrease use of X. Then, by equation (25) it must be that the 
shadow price of food in period 2 (pn2U2f/U2n) has increased (that is,  ∂X/∂px ≥ 0 implies that ∂pf2/∂px >0 by equation (25) since 
∂X/∂px|pf2 < 0 and ∂X/∂pf2 > 0). If the shadow price of food rises in period 2, then FL decreases by equation (10a) (middle part). 
This implies that Lf has increased, since the nondecrease in X leads to a nondecrease in FL without any change in Lf (since FLX  ≥ 
0) and since FLL < 0.  An increase in Lf and nondecrease in X implies that Yf (and therefore Cf2) has increased. An increase in Cf2 
will tend to reduce the shadow price of food in period 2, unless Cn2 has also increased. An increase in Cf2 also implies that Cf1 and 
Cn1 must have increased, assuming these are net substitutes for Cf2, since the shadow price of Cf2 has increased. But an increase in 
all consumption goods and inputs and in the price of inputs is inconsistent with the combined budget constraint (equation [13]). 
Hence, we have a contradiction, and X must have decreased. A similar argument can be used to show that food production 
declines as px increases. If Yf does not decline, Lf must have increased as X decreased. This, together with the fact that X has 
decreased, implies that FL has decreased. Then by equation (10a), the shadow price of food in period 2 (pn2U2f/U2n) must have 
increased. As above, if Cf2 has not decreased (since Yf has not decreased) and the shadow price of food has increased, this implies 
that Cn2 has increased and, if Cf1 and Cn1 are net substitutes for Cf2, these must also have increased.  The cost of production must 
also have increased since Yf has not decreased and the increase in px increases the cost function C(px, w1, Yf). Again we have a 
contradiction with equation (13), since all consumption goods and the cost of production cannot increase within the household’s 
budget constraint.  19 
Implications of a Binding Credit Constraint 
Using a similar approach to that used in the case of autarky in the food market, we assess the implications 
of a binding credit constraint by replacing exogenous r1 by an endogenously determined shadow price of 
credit (r1
s), where r1
s equates credit demand and supply: 
  1 11 (,)
s B rZ B =     (27) 
Then the effects of a change in any exogenous variable (Zi) on endogenous variable yj in the context of a 
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where ∂yj/∂Zi|r1
s refers to the effect of Zi on yj, taking r1 as fixed and borrowing as endogenous, while the 
second term is the effect of Zi via its effect on the shadow price of credit. Note that equation (28) can be 
used to determine impacts irrespective of market regime, as long as the partial effects used in equation 
(28) (∂yj/∂Zi|r1
s and ∂yj/∂r1) are the ones relevant to the market regime being considered.  
We obtain the impacts of changes in Zi on the shadow price of credit by total differentiation of 
equation (27): 

















           (29) 
As shown previously, ∂B1/∂r1 < 0 for market participants. Thus, for market participants, the sign of 
∂r1
s/∂Zi is the same as the sign of ∂B1/∂Zi. We use this fact, together with equation (28) and the 
implications already derived for unconstrained households, to derive implications for credit constrained 
market participants (Table 2).  
For autarkic households, the sign for ∂B1/∂r1 is ambiguous, as discussed earlier. Hence, the 
implications of changes in Zi on yj for credit-constrained autarkic households are generally ambiguous. 
One exception is the effects of changes on Cn2. With borrowing constrained, the second-period budget 
constraint for an autarkic household becomes  21 22 2 2 1 (1 ) nn p Cw L T r B = +− +      (B2′) . 
Cn2 is completely determined by the exogenous variables in constraint (B2′) (pn2, w2, L2, T2, r1, 
and B1) for a credit-constrained autarkic household. Thus, an increase in w2, L2, or T2 would increase Cn2, 
while an increase in pn2, r1, or B1 would decrease Cn2, and changes in other exogenous variables have no 
effect on Cn2.  
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Lf  Lo1  X Y Cf1  Cn1  Cf2  Cn2  r1
s  Sf2  Pf2  Utility 
B1↑  S/B +  -  +  +  +  + ? ? - ?  ? + 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  -  ?  ?  ?  + 
pf2↑ S  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  +  ?  0  + 
 B  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  0  ?  - 
 A  0/?  0/?  0/?  0/?  0/?  0/?  0/?  0  0/?  0/?  0/?  0/+ 
pf1↑  S/B ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ?  - 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  0  ?  ?  ?  - 
pn1↑ S/B  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  - 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  0  ?  ?  ?  - 
pn2↑ S/B  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  - 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  -  ?  ?  ?  - 
px↑  S/B ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ? ?  ?
(-)  ? ?  - 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  0  ?  ?  ?  - 
w1↑  S/B ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? + 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  0  ?  ?  ?  + 
r1↑  S/B +  -  +  +  - - -  - - +  -  - 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  -  ?  ?  ?  - 
K↑ S/B  ?  ?  ?  +  ?  ?  +  +  +  +  -  + 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  0  ?  ?  ?  + 
L1↑  S/B +  +  +  +  +  + + + - +  -  + 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  0  ?  ?  ?  + 
L2↑  S/B -  +  -  -  +  +  + + + -  + + 
  A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ? + ? ?  ? + 
T1↑  S/B +  -  +  +  +  + + + - +  -  + 
 A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  0  ?  ?  ?  + 
T2↑  S/B -  +  -  -  +  +  + + + -  + + 
  A  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ? ? + ? ?  ? + 
Symbols:  S = seller, B = buyer, S/B = seller or buyer, A = autarkic 
+ = positive impact, – = negative impact, 0 = no impact, 0/+ = no or positive impact, ? = ambiguous impact 
n means Cf1, Cn1, Cf2, and Cn2 are assumed to be net substitutes for each other for these results. 
(-) means effect is negative if εx,px < -1. 
(+) means effect is positive if εx,px < -1. 
Qualitative impacts on household utility are unambiguous in general and the same as without a 
binding borrowing constraint. For example, an increase in the household’s exogenous income, labor 
endowment, or productive capital will increase utility by increasing full income, regardless of whether 
credit is constrained. An increase in a price of a good or input that the household buys will decrease real 21 
income and hence utility, while an increase in the price of food or labor (if the household sells food or 
labor) will increase real income and utility.  
Impacts on other endogenous variables are ambiguous, however. In the remainder of this 
subsection we discuss the impacts of exogenous changes, assuming that the household is a market 
participant.  
An increase in the amount of credit available to a credit-constrained market participant (B1) 
reduces the shadow price of credit. The qualitative effects of this are the same as reducing r1 for 
nonconstrained households. 
An increase in pf2 (or reduction in ts2) increases the shadow price of credit for a food-selling 
household, since this increases the demand for credit by such households (recall the results in Table 1). 
The resulting effects on input use, production, and consumption are ambiguous, however, since the 
increase in pf2 tends to increase use of inputs, food production, and consumption of all goods, but the 
increase in the shadow price of credit tends to reduce these (or has ambiguous effects in the case of Cf2 
and Cn2).  
An increase in pf2 for food buyers, or an increase in other good or factor prices (pf1, pn1, pn2, px, or 
w1) have ambiguous effects on all endogenous variables except utility. This is because changes in these 
prices have ambiguous effects on credit demand, as shown in Table 1.  
An increase in K has ambiguous impacts on input and labor use in food production and on first-
period consumption if credit is constrained. Without any change in input use or first-period consumption, 
the increase in K would result in an increase in Yf2 and second-period income, which would be used to 
increase both Cf2 and Cn2. Since the increase in K increases the marginal productivity of inputs in food 
production, the household would want to increase both labor and input use in period 1, if borrowing were 
allowed at the initial shadow cost of credit. It would also want to increase Cf1 and Cn1 to smooth the 
increase in consumption between periods. It would not be able to do all of this, however, since credit is 
constrained. In order to increase consumption in the first period, it would have to reduce use of labor and 
inputs; conversely, to increase labor and input use, it would have to reduce first-period consumption. The 
net impact of these tendencies is an ambiguous change in use of inputs and first-period consumption.  
However, Yf, Cf2 and Cn2 will unambiguously increase.
17  Since increased consumption of both 
food and nonfood goods in the second period is financed only by the increased value of food production 
                                                 
17 Proof:  Suppose that Yf does not increase as a result of an increase in K, which implies that neither Cf2 nor Cn2 increase, 
since both are normal goods. If Yf did not increase, the cost of food production (w1Lf +pxX) would decrease, since increasing K 
increases productivity and hence reduces the cost function. Since the cost of food production has decreased, more income is 
available for consumption in period 1, and both Cf1 and Cn1 increase. If first-period consumption increases while second-period 
consumption does not, the shadow price of credit would decrease, since this reflects the marginal rate of substitution between 
first- and second-period consumption, which decreases in this case. However, this contradicts the fact that the demand for credit 
increases if K increases (shown in Table 1), which implies that the shadow price of credit must increase (equation [29]). Hence 
we have a contradiction, and Yf, Cf2, and Cn2 increase as a result of increased K. 22 
(since borrowing is fixed), the increase in Yf must be greater than the increase in Cf2; food sales increase if 
the household is a food seller, or food purchases decrease if the household is a food buyer in period 2.  
An increase in L1 or T1 will reduce the demand for credit in the first period and thus reduce the 
shadow price of credit. Although these variables would not influence labor or input use in food 
production if credit were unconstrained (Table 1), the relaxation of the borrowing constraint and reduced 
shadow price of credit leads to an increase in Lf and X, according to equation (28). This leads to an 
increase in Yf, which increases second-period income, resulting in an increase in Cf2 and Cn2. Cf1 and Cn1 
also increase in equation (28), since these rise when the interest rate is fixed (Table 1), and the reduction 
in the shadow price of credit contributes further to increased first-period consumption. Since the increase 
in second-period food and nonfood consumption is financed entirely out of the value of increased  food 
production, the increase in Yf must be greater than the increase in Cf2: either food sales increase or food 
purchases decrease.  
Changes in L1 or T1 have different impacts on Lo1, however. An increase in L1 increases Lo1, since 
additional cash income from off-farm employment is needed to finance increased purchases of X, Cf1, and 
Cn1 if credit is constrained. Thus, even though Lf increases, the increase is not as large as that in L1. An 
increase in T1 reduces Lo1 since Lf increases and L1 is assumed to be fixed in this case. 
An increase in L2 or T2 increases the demand for credit in the first period and hence increases the 
shadow price of credit. According to equation (28), this reduces Lf, X, and Yf. Lo1 increases since Lf 
declines (assuming L1 is unchanged) and this, together with reduced X, means cash available to finance 
consumption in period 1 has increased, leading to an increase in Cf1 and Cn1. Second-period consumption 
must also increase, since otherwise the shadow price of credit would have decreased. Thus, the value of 
the decline in Yf must be less than the increase in w2L2 or in T2. Since Yf declines and Cf2 increases, food 
sales decline or food purchases increase.  
An increase in the market interest rate has the same impact as a reduction in T2 when credit is 
constrained. This is because the market interest rate is not relevant to the household’s first-period 
decisions with a binding credit constraint (what matters is the shadow price of credit), and the increase in 
r1 simply reduces second-period income by the amount B1dr1. Thus, when credit is constrained, an 
increase in r1 causes a reduction in the shadow price of credit, increased use of labor and inputs in food 
production, reduced off-farm labor supply, reduced consumption of all goods, and increased food sales or 
reduced food purchases, just as a reduction in T2 would. Hence, for credit-constrained households, 
increasing the interest rate can induce them to produce and sell more food, although this reduces their 
consumption and welfare—an interesting implication. If the increase in r1 and reduction in the shadow 
price of credit are sufficiently large that the shadow price  falls below r1 (assuming the same level of B1), 
the demand for credit will fall below B1 and the credit constraint will no longer be binding.  23 
Effects of Production Credit Usable Only for Purchased Inputs 
The discussion above assumes that credit is provided in cash and can be used to purchase consumption 
goods as well as inputs. In Ethiopia, production credit is most often provided in kind and tied to purchase 
of inputs. If credit use is restricted to purchasing inputs, we have B1 ≤ pXX. If the credit constraint is 
binding (before and after the marginal increase in credit availability), then dB1 = pX dX; that is, all of the 
increase in B1 is used to purchase increased amounts of X. Because X and Lf are normal inputs and their 
prices are unchanged, Lf will also increase, implying that Y increases and Lo1 decreases. Budget constraint 
(C1) implies that the value of consumption in period 1 must therefore decrease, and since food and 
nonfood are normal goods and their prices are unchanged, both decrease. In this case, the use of inputs 
and production increases more than if credit were more flexible, while consumption in period 1 declines, 
causing the household’s discount rate to be even higher and the credit constraint to be even more binding. 
Although such a policy of restricting the use of credit for purchasing inputs can be effective in promoting 
increased use of purchased inputs and production, it worsens the problem of constrained credit and 
reduces farmers’ profits and welfare, compared to a more flexible credit policy. Promoting increased food 
production and commercialization through restrictive policy measures is not necessarily desirable. 
The impacts in period 2 are less ambiguous in this case than if more flexible credit is provided in 
period 1. In this case, the value of farm production in the second period net of loan repayment costs will 
increase, since increased labor is attracted into food production by use of increased inputs. Thus, net 
income is increased in period 2 and consumption of both food and nonfood will increase in period 2 if the 
household is a buyer or seller (implying a fixed price relationship between food and nonfood).  
Summary of Model Implications 
These results demonstrate that the implications of many exogenous factors depend upon the position of 
the household in the commodity market as well as on the functioning of the factor markets (credit in this 
case, though labor market constraints would also change the results). For example, an increase in the 
market price of food will improve household welfare if the household is a food seller but reduce welfare if 
the household is a food buyer; it may have no effect on an autarkic household. Reducing marketing 
transaction costs increases the household’s use of inputs and production if the household is not credit-
constrained and is a seller, but it will reduce input use and production if the household’s credit is 
unconstrained and it is a food buyer; it may have no effect if the household is autarkic. These effects 
become more ambiguous if the household is credit-constrained. The effects of an increased interest rate 
are dramatically different between households where credit is constrained and those where it is not: in the 
former case, input use and production increases, while in the latter case, use of inputs and production are 
reduced. 24 
Despite these varying and often ambiguous implications, several robust implications are derived. 
Household welfare is generally improved by increases in productive endowments or income and reduced 
by increases in the price of goods or factors that the household purchases. Increases in productive capital 
in agricultural production lead to increased production in most cases. Increased labor endowment or 
exogenous income (in either period) lead to increased consumption in both periods in most cases. 
These results also demonstrate that changes that increase (reduce) food production and sales need 
not increase (reduce) household consumption and welfare (for example,  reducing the wage rate of net 
labor suppliers). If the objective of policymakers is to improve the welfare of smallholder farmers, and 
not simply to increase commercialization, such distinctions and trade-offs need to be taken into account. 
 25 
3.  EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Empirical investigation of the hypotheses, generated by the theory in the previous section, requires 
specification of the functional forms of the relationships to be estimated and specification of the 
econometric models used to estimate these relationships.   We assume that the utility function is 
log-linear (Cobb-Douglas): 
  11 22 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 (,, ,) l n l n l n l n f nf n f f n n f f n n UC C C C C C C C γ γγ γ = ++ +. (30) 
Since utility maximization is unaffected by a positive monotonic transformation of the utility function, for 
simplification and without loss of generality, we set γf1 + γn1 + γf2 + γn2 = 1. 
We assume that the production function for the food crop is Cobb-Douglas: 
 
kl x
ff YK L X
α αα = ,   (31) 
where αk + αl + αx = 1 (constant returns to scale).  
Implications of the Cobb-Douglas Model 
The implications of this Cobb-Douglas model are less ambiguous than the more general model discussed 
in section 2. Using the above assumptions and the first-order conditions and constraints specified earlier, 
we can derive closed-form solutions for production, input demands, profit, and consumption: 
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= ,   (39) 
where pf2
s is the shadow price of food in the second period, which equals pf2 – ts2 if the household is a food 
seller and pf2 + tb2 if the household is a food buyer, falling between these values if the household is 
autarkic; r1
s is the shadow price of credit, which equals r1 if the household is not credit-constrained and is 
greater than r1 if it is credit constrained; and FI is the household’s discounted full income, which is equal 
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  Setting food production equal to consumption and solving for pf2
s, we can derive an expression 
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The comparative statics of the shadow price of food in this case can be readily determined from equations 
(41) and the definition of FEI in equation (40), assuming the household is not credit constrained. An 
increase in r1, w1, L1, T1, w2, L2, T2, or px leads to an increase in the shadow price of food, while an 
increase in K reduces the shadow price of food.
18  These implications are consistent with the results in 
Table 1 (although the impacts of px and r1 are ambiguous in the more general case). These results imply 
that an autarkic, credit-unconstrained household will be more likely to buy food if r1, w1, L1, T1, w2, L2, T2, 
or px are increased and more likely to sell food if K is increased.  
  The comparative statics for a credit-constrained market participant can also be readily derived for 
this model. Substituting for Lf, X, Cf1, and Cn1 in the first-period budget constraint (B1) using equations 
(33), (34), (36), and (37), and taking into account that B1 = B1 in this case, we can show that  
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Using r1
s as implicitly determined by equation (42) (no explicit solution is possible in general) in 
equations (32) to (40), we determine the solution to the problem with a binding credit constraint. Equation 
(42) implies that r1
s decreases with increases in w1, px, L1, and T1, since these reduce credit demand, and 
increases with increases in w2, L2, T2, pf2
s, and K, since these increase credit demand. Note that these 
                                                 
18 Although an increase in r1 reduces FEI, differentiation of (1+r1)FEI
1-αl-αx with respect to r1 shows that this quantity 
increases with an increase in r1, implying that pf2
s increases with an increase in r1.  27 
implications are consistent with the implications for r1
s shown in Table 2, although some of the results are 
ambiguous in the more general case.  
For a credit-constrained autarkic household, the shadow prices of food and of credit are 
determined jointly by equations (41) and (42). The comparative statics of these shadow prices are 
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The comparative statics for credit-constrained autarkic households are ambiguous even in this 
Cobb-Douglas case, because the sign of the denominator in equations (43) and (44) cannot be determined. 
Econometric Specification and Issues 
We seek to estimate the determinants of the household’s market position for the food crop, which is 
determined by the relationship between the household’s shadow price in autarky and the market price net 
of selling or buying transactions costs. Conditional upon the market position, we want to estimate the 
determinants of food-crop production (for all market positions) and sales or purchases (for market 
participants). We can derive the econometric specification to be estimated from equations (31) to (41).  
Determinants of Food Crop Market Position 
Taking logarithms of equation (41), we have 
  20 1 1 ln( ) ln(1 ) ln( ) ln ln ln
ss
f pp I p k p w p x x p rF E I K w p ββ β β β =++ + + + + ,   (45) 
where the βs are transformations of the parameters in equation (41).
19    These transformations and the 
assumptions of the theory imply that 0<βpI<1, -1<βpk<0, 0<βpw<1, and 0<βpx<1, while the sign of βp0 is 
ambiguous.  
  We assume that lnK is measured with error: 
  ln ln mk KK u = + ,   (46) 
                                                 
19 βp0 = (1-αl-αx)ln(γf2/[1-γf2(1-αl-αx)]- αlln(αl)- αxln(αx), βpI = 1-αl-αx, βpk = -αk, βpw = αl, βpx = αx. 28 
where Km is the measured value of K and uk is an unobserved error, which we assume is normally 
distributed. Substituting equation (46) into (45), we have   
  20 1 1 ln( ) ln(1 ) ln( ) ln ln ln
ss
f p pI pk m pw px x pk k p r FEI K w p u ββ β β β β =++ + + + + + . (47) 
One problem in using equation (47) as the basis for estimation is that we do not have data for w1, 
w2, T1, or T2, or separate estimates of L1 and L2, affecting our ability to estimate FEI.
20  Furthermore, FEI 
depends on r1
s, which is also not observed for credit-constrained households. For simplification, we 
assume that T1 and T2 are negligible relative to w1L1 and w2L2, that w1=w2=w, and that L1 = L2 = L. These 
simplifications imply that ln(FEI) ≈ ln(w) + ln(L) + ln(2+r1
s) – ln(1+r1
s). Substituting these into equation 
(47), we have 
20 1 1 ln( ) (1 )ln(1 ) ln(2 ) ln ln ( )
ln ln .
ss s
f p pI pI pI pk m pI pw
px x pk k
pr r L K
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β βββ β β β
ββ
=+ − + + + + + + +
++
  (48)  
Equation (48) could be used as the basis for estimation for credit-unconstrained households, for 
whom r1
s = r1. Since we don’t know which households are credit-constrained or r1
s for those that are 
constrained, we have to approximate r1
s. Equation (42) implicitly defines r1
s as a function of w, L, pf2
s, K, 
px, and B1, as noted earlier. Using first-order translogarithmic functions to approximate 1 + r1
s and 2 + r1
s 
and assuming that available credit (B1) is determined by the household’s endowment of productive capital 
(K), including the quantity and quality of land owned, and membership in credit and savings 
organizations (C), we have
21  
  10 2 1 ln(1 ) ln ln ln ln ln
s
wlk p f f p x x c r rw L K p p C u χχ χ χ χ χ χ += + + + + + + +  and   (49) 
  10 2 2 ln(2 ) ln ln ln ln ln
s
wlk p f f p x x c r rw L K p p C u θθ θ θ θ θ θ += + + + + + ++.   (50) 
Households’ wage rates were also not observed. We assume that these are determined by the 
same factors that determine food production (and hence  the value of labor in food production), as well as 
by the household’s endowment of human capital (HC):   
  02 ln( ) ln ln ln ln lk p f f p x x h c w wL K p p H C u λ λλ λ λ λ =+ + + + + +. (51)   
Substituting equations (49), (50), and (51) into equation (48), solving for ln(pf2
s), redefining the 
βs and defining up, we have   
  20 0 ln( ) ln ln ln
s
f pp l p km p x x p c p h p pp p p p LK p C H C u Z u ββ β β β β ββ =+ + + + + + ≡+ + , (52) 
                                                 
20 We attempted to measure exogenous income T1 and T2 in the survey, but the data are beset by serious measurement 
problems, undermining their reliability.  
21 The logarithm of C is not used in equations (49) and (50) because C is a dummy variable. 29 
where Zp = [ln(L), ln(Km), ln(px), C, HC], βp = (βpl, βpk, βpx, βpc, βph) and up is a linear combination of uk, 
ur1, ur2, and uw. Assuming that these error terms are normally distributed, up will also be normally 
distributed. We assume that up~N(0,σp). 
The household will be a food seller if pf2
s < pf2
m – ts2, a buyer if pf2
s > pf2
m + tb2, and autarkic in the 
food market if pf2
m – ts2 ≤ pf2
s ≤ pf2
m + tb2. We assume that buying and selling transaction costs are 
proportional to the market price (that is, ts2 = τs2 pf2
m and tb2 = τb2 pf2
m) and that  τs2 and τb2 are determined 
by the household’s ownership of transportation assets such as vehicles and pack animals, access to roads 
and markets, social relationships with traders, and membership in a cooperative (Zm):
22 
  22 2 2 2 0 ln( ) ln( ) ln(1 ) ln( )
mm m
f sf sf s s m p tp p Z τβ β −= +−= −−  and   (53) 
  22 2 2 2 0 ln( ) ln( ) ln(1 ) ln( )
mm m
f bf bf b b m p tp p Z τβ β += ++= ++ .   (54) 
Combining equations (52), (53), and (54), we have the empirical model that determines the 
household’s choice of market position: 
 Seller:    20 0 ln( )
m
pfs s m p p p s up Z Z c ββ ββ <− − − − ≡ ,   (55) 
 Buyer:      20 0 ln( )
m
pfb b m p p p b up Z Z c ββ ββ >+ + − − ≡ , and  (56) 
 Autarky:    s pb cuc ≤ ≤ . (57) 
  We estimate the parameters in inequalities (55), (56), and (57), using maximum 
likelihood estimation, assuming that up is normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviation of 
σp. The log likelihood function (LL) is given by 
  ln[ ( )] ln[1 ( )] ln[ ( ) ( )]
si bi bi si
i sellers i buyers i autarky pp p p
cc c c
LL
σσ σ σ ∈∈ ∈
=Φ + − Φ + Φ − Φ ∑∑ ∑ ,   (58) 
where Ф( ) is the standard normal distribution function. 
  This model is like an ordered probit model, although σp can potentially be identified in 
this model (unlike an ordered probit) because ln(pf2
m) is observed and the ratio ln(pf2
m)/σp is a part of the 
likelihood function. However, if the estimated value of σp is large, the term ln(pf2
m)/σp (which enables 
identification of σp) becomes small, and has little influence on the likelihood function. In this case, σp may 
not be identified. We found this to be the case in estimating the model for maize market position (but not 
for teff). Thus, the coefficients in the maize market position model reported in the results are ratios of 
β/σp, as in an ordered probit model. 
                                                 
22 For continuous elements of Zp and Zm (such as value of assets and distance to the nearest road), we use logarithmic 
transformations. Otherwise these are vectors of dummy variables. 30 
Marginal Effects 
To facilitate interpretation of the parameters estimated using the likelihood function in equation (58), we 





















































= ,   62) 
 







= , and    (63) 
 
()










=− ,   (64) 
where Zmj is the jth variable in Zm, Zpj is the jth variable in Zp, βsj is the jth coefficient in βs, βbj is the jth 
coefficient in βb, and βpj is the jth coefficient in βp. Note that since cs and cb vary across households, 
depending upon the values of pf2
m, Zm, and Zp, these marginal effects vary across households. We estimate 
these at the means of pf2
m, Zm, and Zp.  
Determinants of Food Crop Production 
Taking logarithms of equation (32), substituting for ln(1+r1
s) from equation (49), ln(K) from equation 
(46), ln(w) from equation (51), and ln(pf2
s) from equation (53) (for food sellers) or (54) (for food buyers), 
we have the specification for food-crop production of sellers and buyers:  
  Sellers:    02 ln( )
s sm ss s
f yy p f y s m y p p y Yp Z Z u ββ β β =+ + + + ,  and  (65) 
 Buyers:    02 ln( )
bb m b b b
fyy p f y s m y p p y Yp Z Z u ββ β β =+ + + + , (66) 




y are linear combinations of ur1, uk, and uw.  
For autarkic households, we substitute for ln(pf2
s), using equation (52) to obtain: 
 Autarky:    0
aa a
f yy p p y YZ u ββ =+ + . (67) 
In this case u
a







y are linear combinations of many of the same variables as up (and since u
a
y is 
a linear combination of up with these other variables), all of these error terms are likely to be correlated 31 
with up. This creates a potential selection bias if equations (65), (66), and (67) were estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  
To address this endogenous selection issue, we estimate these equations using a switching 
regression framework. Taking conditional expectations of equations (65) to (67), we have 
 Sellers:    02 (| ) l n ( ) ( | )
ss m s s s
fp s y y p f y s m y p p yp s EY u c p Z Z Eu u c ββ β β <= + + + + <,   (68) 
 Buyers:    02 (| ) l n ( ) ( | )
bb m b b b
f pb y y p f y s m y p p y pb E Yu c p Z Z E u u c ββ β β >= + + + + >, and   (69) 
 Autarky:    0 (| ) ( | )
aa a
fs p b y y p p ys p b EY c u c Z Eu c u c ββ ≤≤= + + ≤≤.   (70) 






y are pairwise bivariate normally distributed, with 













respectively, we can derive the selection bias correction terms in equations (68), (69), and (70): 
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where φ( ) is the standard normal density function and Ф( ) is the standard normal distribution function. 
We estimate the switching regression model by including the selection correction terms from 
equations (71), (72), and (73), respectively, in the corresponding regression equations (68), (69), and (70). 
The parameters estimated in the maximum likelihood estimation for determinants of market position (βs 
and σp) are used to calculate cb and cs and the inverse Mills type ratios in equations (71) to (73) for each 
observation. Since these parameters are estimated values, this two-stage procedure does not produce a 
consistent estimate of the covariance matrix. To produce consistent estimates of the standard errors, we 
use bootstrapping (resampling from the first stage of the estimation). 
Determinants of the Level of Sales and Purchases 
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Equation (74) shows that sales are positively linearly related to production and negatively linearly 
related to FEI. Unfortunately, as noted earlier, FEI is not directly observed and depends on variables that 
are not observed (such as r1
s, w1, w2, L1, L2, T1, T2). Using the assumptions made earlier that w1 = w2 = w, 
L1 = L2 = L, and T1 = T2 = 0, we find (as before) that FEI = wL(2 + r1
s)/(1 + r1
s). Substituting from 
equations (49), (50), (51), and (53), we can show that  
  22 0 2 [1 (1 )] exp( ln )
ss m s s
f fl x f p f f Z p p Z m m s SY p Z Z u γα α δ δ δ δ =− − − − + + + + .   (75) 
Similarly, for households that are food buyers: 
  20 2 2 exp( ln ) [1 (1 )]
bb m b b
f pf f Zp p Zm m b f l x f Pp Z Z u Y δδ δ δ γ α α =+ + + + − − − − ,   (76) 
where we assume that us ~ N(0,σs
2) and ub ~ N(0,σb
2). The assumption that us and ub are normally 
distributed is consistent with the fact that these error terms are linear combinations of uw and ur2, which 
we have assumed to be normally distributed.  
Equations (75) and (76) are the basis for econometric estimation of the determinants of the level 
of food sales and purchases, conditional on the household being a food seller or buyer. As with the 
production regressions for sellers and buyers, there is a potential selection bias in estimating equations 
(75) and (76). Taking conditional expectations of equation (75) and substituting for Yf using equation 
(59), we have  
22
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yp Zp; that is, the nonstochastic part of Yf in equation (59). E(u
s
y| 
up < cs) is given by equation (71). Assuming that up and us are bivariate normal (BN), with (up, us) ~ 
BN(0,0,σp, σs, ρps), it can be shown that E(exp(us)| up < cs) is equal to
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23 Sketch of proof:  The conditional expectation in equation (78) is given by 
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where εp = up/σp and εs = up/σs, implying that (εp,εs) ~ BN(0,0,1,1, ρps). f(εs|εp) is the conditional density of εs given εp, and 
f(εp) is the standard univariate normal density function. The denominator in the expression above is Φ(cs/σp). Amemiya (1988) 
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By substituting this expression into the above equation, carrying out the double integration, and simplifying, we obtain 
equation (78). To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this result has not appeared before in the literature on selection models. 33 
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Note that E[exp(us)| up < cs] equals exp(σs
2/2) if ρps = 0, which is the unconditional expectation of 
exp(us) for normally distributed us (that is, there is no selection bias in this case, but the variance of us 
affects the estimated coefficients since the error term exp(us) is multiplicative), and equals 1 if σs = 0. For 
positive values of σs and ρps, the selection bias term in equation (78) is less than exp(σs
2/2) and is 




y| up < cs), we use the predicted value of Yf from estimating equation (68) (including the selection 
correction term). We identify only the total coefficient of Yf in equation (75), and not the separate values 
of γf2, αl, and αx. We use estimated values of cs and σp from the maximum likelihood estimation given in 





pf, δZp, δZm, σ,s, and ρps. We use bootstrapping to compute the standard errors because of 
the two-stage nature of the estimation.  
The counterpart to equation (77) for purchases is 
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The expression E(u
b
y| up > cb) is given by equation (72). The counterpart to equation (78) for purchases is 
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where we have assumed that (up, ub) ~ BN(0,0,σp,σb, ρpb). Equations (79) and (80) are used to estimate 
determinants of the level of purchases. 
Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses 
The explanatory variables used in the estimations include measures of factors determining sellers’ and 
buyers’ transaction costs (Zm) and factors determining the shadow price of food crops (Zp). The measured 
variables reflecting these factors in the estimations and their hypothesized impacts on transaction costs or 
shadow prices (based on unconstrained borrowing model results in Table 1) include the following. 
Determinants of Transaction Costs 
•  Distance to the nearest sales market for cereals (+) 34 
•  Distance to the nearest all-weather road (+) 
•  Value of transportation assets owned (such as  vehicles, pack animals) (–) 
•  Number of traders known by the household outside of the Peasant Association (PA)(–)24  
•  Household membership in a cooperative (–) 
Determinants of Food Shadow Price 
•  Price of diammonium phosphate (DAP) fertilizer (px) (?) 
•  Number of workers in the household (L) (+) 
•  Share of household members whose primary occupation is (compared to crop production)
25:  
−  Livestock production (?) 
−  Domestic activities (–, due to lower expected wage and income) 
−  Nonfarm activities (?) 
•  Share of labor force that is (compared to men) (part of HC): 
−  Women (–, due to lower expected wage) 
−  Children (–, due to lower expected wage) 
•  Male head of household (part of HC) (+, due to higher expected wage and income) 
•  Age of head of household (part of HC) (+, due to higher expected wage and income) 
•  Primary or secondary education of men and women (part of HC) (+, due to higher expected 
income) 
•  Area of land operated (part of K) (–) 
•  Quality of land operated (part of K), measured by  
−  Slope (share gently or steeply sloping or mixed slopes) (+) 
−  Altitude (shares in medium- altitude woina dega  or high-altitude dega zones) (+) 
−  Soil type (share of high-quality lem soil or low-quality teuf, or mixed soil types) (– for lem 
and + for teuf, relative to mixed) 
−  Distance of operated land from residence (share more than one hour’s walk from residence) 
(+) 
−  Access to irrigation (–) 
•  Value of livestock owned (part of K) (–) 
•  Value of farm equipment owned (part of K) (–) 
•  Membership in a credit or savings organization (C) (?) 
The hypotheses concerning the impacts of most of these measured variables are self-explanatory. 
For example, variables such as distance to markets and roads are expected to increase transaction costs, 
while ownership of transportation assets, relationships with traders, and membership in a cooperative are 
                                                 
24 A Peasant Association is the lowest administrative level in the system of government in Ethiopia, usually consisting of 
several villages. 
25 These variables are considered part of human capital (HC) and may affect the opportunity cost of labor (w). 35 
expected to reduce transaction costs. Ownership of productive capital such as land, better-quality land, 
livestock, and equipment are expected to increase production potential and thus reduce the shadow price 
of food. In the case of measures of human capital, the expected impacts depend upon whether and how 
these variables affect wage levels and income. We expect older households, more educated households, 
households with a male head or more male workers to have higher wages and income, and thus to have a 
higher shadow price of food due to greater effective demand. We expect households having more 
members involved in domestic activities to have lower incomes than those more involved in crop 
production, and therefore lower effective food demand and shadow prices. Involvement in other 
livelihood activities has ambiguous impacts on food shadow prices, since the effects of these activities on 
income are more ambiguous. We expect membership in a credit or savings institution to reduce the 
interest rate that the household must pay or to increase the household’s access to credit (the latter effect if 
borrowing is constrained), or both, but these effects have an ambiguous impact on the shadow price of 
food (see Table 1). 
The hypothesized impacts of these variables on food production, sales, and purchases follow from 
their relationships to the underlying factors included in the theoretical model and their hypothesized 
impacts as summarized in Tables 1 and 2. As these tables show, the expected impacts of many factors are 
more ambiguous for autarkic households than for buyers or sellers and more ambiguous if credit is 
constrained. 36 
4.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
Data Source and Sample 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based upon a nationally representative survey of 7,186 households 
and 293 communities conducted by IFPRI and the Central Statistics Authority (CSA) of Ethiopia during 
June and July 2005. A stratified two-stage cluster sample design was used to select the sample. 
Enumeration areas (EAs) were taken as primary sampling units and agricultural households as secondary 
sampling units. Sample EAs from each stratum were subsamples of the 2004/05 (1997 Ethiopian 
Calendar (EC)) Annual Agricultural Sample Survey of CSA. EAs were selected using systematic 
sampling based on probability proportional to size, size being the number of agricultural households 
obtained from the 1994 Population and Housing Census, adjusted for the subsampling effect. The 25 
agricultural households randomly selected from each sample EA for the 2004/05 Annual Agricultural 
Sample Survey were also directly taken to be the secondary sampling units for this survey.  
The sample size was determined taking into consideration the resources allocated for the survey 
and the precision desired for total cereal crop production and cattle population, using the results of the 
2004/05 CSA Annual Agricultural Sample Survey to estimate precision. A total of 293 EAs  and 7,325 
agricultural households were found to be sufficient to achieve a coefficient of variation (CV) of 15 
percent in estimating household cereal production and livestock population. For the purpose of the survey, 
the country was divided into five strata. The first four strata consist of the four major rural regions:  
Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s (SNNP) regions. The fifth 
stratum includes all regions other than the four named. Each of the four major regions was considered to 
be the domain of estimation or a stratum for which major findings of the survey are reported. Findings for 
all of rural Ethiopia were also obtained by combining the results of each of the stratum. To distribute the 
sample EAs among the strata, we implemented a power allocation technique.  
The study covered all rural areas of the country except Gambella Region (all zones), and the 
nonsedentary population of three zones of Afar and six zones of Somali regions. The survey also included 
rural parts of Harari, Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and 58 additional zones / special weredas (districts) (that 
are treated as zones) of other regions. 
The data were collected using household and community questionnaires, translated into Amharic, 
that were pretested three times in different agro-ecological locations. . CSA enumerators with statisticians 
and branch officers were trained regarding the questionnaires and overall data collection. The household 
questionnaire included questions on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the household 
and its members (such as gender, age, marital status, education, and primary and secondary activities); 
income from different sources (crop production, livestock production, off-farm employment, nonfarm 37 
activities, and other income); land tenure, land use, and characteristics of agricultural parcels; land 
investments, land management practices, agricultural inputs, and outputs by plot; household-level supply, 
use and marketing (sales and purchases) of agricultural commodities (crops, livestock, and livestock 
products) by type of commodity and period (between June 2004 and May 2005); purchases of agricultural 
inputs; output marketing arrangements ( use of regular buyers or sellers, intermediaries, and contracts); 
transaction costs for a single transaction; household assets; access and use of credit; social capital 
(membership in local organizations and associations, informal contacts, and networks); access to public 
goods and services ( such as agricultural extension, market information, infrastructure, health services, 
and schools); and food security and income shocks. The community questionnaire included questions on 
the population of the Peasant Association (PA) and its ethnic and religious composition; major income 
sources of households; access to infrastructure and social services; access to markets and economic 
services; contracting and dispute-resolution mechanisms; sources of technologies; cooperatives and other 
local organizations; agro-ecological characteristics of the PA; land use; agricultural products produced 
and inputs used; disease and pest problems; marketing and prices of agricultural commodities; marketing 
problems; presence of traders; and others. 
Descriptive Results 
In this section we present descriptive results concerning the nature and extent of commercialization of 
food crops by smallholder farmers in Ethiopia, based on analysis of the IFPRI/CSA survey. We present 
results on the percentage of producing farmers participating in crop sales markets by type of crop and 
season, the extent of commercialization (share of production sold) by type of crop, the net market 
positions of producers of different types of crops, and the extent of diversification of production, sales, 
and purchases of cereals. 
Crop Market Participation 
On average, 57 percent of the crop farmers in the sample sold crops in one or more crop markets during 
the 2004/05 crop year, ranging from 43 percent in Tigray to 67 percent in Amhara (Table 3). A larger 
proportion of farmers participated in these markets during the postharvest period than in the preharvest 
period. Overall market participation is the highest for producers of cereal crops (42 percent), followed by 
producers of pulses (16 percent), oil crops (14 percent), and horticultural crops (13 percent). 
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Table 3. Percentage of farmers participating in crop markets by season, 2004/05 
Crop 
category  Seasons TIGRAY  AMHARA  OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  9  19  12  10  12 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  24  45  42  40  39 
Cereal crops 
Annual 25  48  45  46  42 
Pre-harvest (June to Nov ’04)  3  6  3  3  4 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  9  18  13  12  13 
Pulse crops 
Annual 10  22  15  15  16 
Pre-harvest (June to Nov ’04)  4  4  1  0  2 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  12  15  14  2  12 
Oil crops 
Annual 6  21  12  15  14 
Pre-harvest (June to Nov ’04)  3  10  5  9  7 
Post-harvest (Dec to May ’05)  5  15  9  12  10 
Horticultural 
crops 
Annual 13  17  15  2  13 
All crops  Annual  43  67  59  57  57 
Source: IFPRI/CSA Survey 2005.  
Note: The different crops were aggregated using values calculated based on the price at which the farmer sold. 
Among producers of cereal crops, teff and wheat producers had the highest market participation: 
48 percent of farmers producing teff and 37 percent producing wheat participated in the markets at the 
national level (Table 4). Among regions, the highest proportion of producing farmers participated in the 
teff market in SNNP (67 percent), followed by Oromiya (50 percent), Amhara (45 percent), and Tigray 
(18 percent). Most farmers sold cereals during the postharvest period (December to May). 
Table 4.  Percentage of farmers participating in cereal crop markets by season, 2004/05 
Cereal  crop  Season  TIGRAY AMHARA OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Teff  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  6  16  12  16  14 
  Post-harvest (Dec to May ’05)  17  40  47  56  43 
 Annual  18  45  50  67  48 
Barley  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  4  7  5  4  5 
  Post-harvest (Dec to May ’05)  14  14  27  21  19 
 Annual  15  17  30  24  21 
Wheat  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  5  7  9  4  7 
  Post-harvest (Dec to May ’05)  20  25  40  43  35 
 Annual  23  26  44  46  37 
Maize  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  4  6  4  5  5 
  Post-harvest (Dec to May ’05)  6  19  16  18  16 
 Annual  8  20  18  21  18 
Sorghum  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  5  13  4  1  5 
  Post-harvest (Dec to May ’05)  17  31  21  10  20 
 Annual  18 34 22  11  22 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA Survey 2005.39 
Next to cereals, pulses are the second most produced crop in Ethiopia. Different levels of market 
participation are observed among producers of pulses (Table 5). Producers of grass pea were most likely 
to sell some of their production in 2004/05 (43 percent), followed by producers of lentils (41 percent), 
chickpeas (38 percent), horse beans (28 percent), field peas (28 percent), and haricot beans (15 percent). 
As with cereals, most farmers sold during the postharvest period.  
Table 5. Percentage of farmers participating in pulse crop markets by season, 2004/05 
Pulse  crop  Season  TIGRAY AMHARA OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  8  6  2  5  6 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  23  22  24  29  24 
Horse beans 
Annual 23  33  25  19  28 
Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  6  19  9  4  13 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  15  39  26  18  31 
Lentils 
Annual 15  54  34  21  41 
Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  15  2  5  4  6 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  15  28  39  17  37 
Chickpea 
Annual 23  29  39  17  38 
Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ‘04  6  7  4  8  6 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  15  13  33  33  23 
Field pea 
Annual 17  19  36  41  28 
Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)    9  9  4  7 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)    18  7  7  9 
Haricot 
beans 
Annual   25  16  9  15 
Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  0  9  4    9 
Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  20  30  49    41 
Grass pea 
Annual 20  33  51    43 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA survey 2005. 
The major oil crops produced in the country are linseed, groundnut, sesame, sunflower, and Niger 
seed (nueg). The highest market participation is observed for sesame, with 74 percent of the producers 
selling, followed by groundnuts (71 percent), nueg (70 percent), linseed (50 percent), and sunflower seeds 
(23 percent) (Table 6). Most farmers sell during the postharvest period.  
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Table 6. Percentage of farmers participating in oil crop markets by season, 2004/05 
Oil crop  Market Position  TIGRAY  AMHARA  OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Linseed  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  8  6  9  17  8 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  16  24  65  39  44 
 Annual  21  29  72  56  50 
Groundnut  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  50  0  13  0  9 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  50  0  27  17  67 
 Annual  50  0  40  17  71 
Sesame  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  19  21  2  0  14 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  71  57  78  0  66 
 Annual  76  70  80  0  74 
Sunflower  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)    5    0  4 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)    24    20  21 
 Annual    27    20  23 
Nueg  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  6  12  2  20  8 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  33  57  69  80  64 
 Annual  39  65  71  100  70 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA Survey, 2005  
Following the expansion of irrigation schemes, which are associated with production of high-
value horticultural crops, the production of horticultural crops has been increasing in the country. Among 
horticultural crop producers, the highest proportion of producing farmers sold tomatoes (71 percent) and 
carrots (70 percent), followed by onions (49 percent) and beetroots (49 percent) (Table 7). Unlike other 
crops, the timing of horticultural crop sales is more mixed because  irrigated crops produced during the 
prior dry postharvest season are sold during the preharvest season.  
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Table 7. Percentage of farmers participating in horticultural crop markets by season, 2004/05 
Horticultural 
crop  Season  TIGRAY AMHARA OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Potato  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  27  22  17  1  16 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  27  19  11  3  13 
 Annual  41  31  27  4  23 
Onion  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  24  34  19  31  26 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  35  24  29  47  33 
 Annual  50  52  35  69  49 
Tomato  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  67  40  0  –  18 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  67  40  40  –  63 
 Annual  100  53  40  –  71 
Sweet potato  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  –  0  8  12  10 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  –  29  14  19  17 
 Annual  –  29  21  23  22 
Cabbage  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  –  7  7  16  12 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  –  32  8  12  13 
 Annual  –  36  13  17  18 
Beet root  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  –  60  24  25  37 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  –  20  20  25  17 
 Annual  –  60  44  25  49 
Carrot  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  43  27  55  25  52 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  71  27  9  25  23 
 Annual  100  45  64  50  70 
Ginger  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  –  –  25  33  28 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  –  –  17  50  28 
 Annual  –  –  33  67  44 
Garlic  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  7  4  13  26  11 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  37  15  18  18  18 
 Annual  37  19  26  42  26 
Pepper  Pre-harvest  (June to Nov ’04)  13  4  2  9  4 
  Post-harvest ( Dec to May ’05)  6  10  21  40  17 
 Annual  19  11  22  49  20 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA survey 2005. 
Consistent with these results, data on the timing of sales show that the amount of cereals, pulses, 
and oil crops sold is much greater during the December to May period than in the preharvest season (June 
to November) (Figures 1 to 3). The pattern of sales varies somewhat across the regions and by type of 
crop, with cereal sales peaking earlier and having a higher level (per household) in higher-rainfall SNNP 
and Oromia than in lower-rainfall Tigray and Amhara. Pulse sales per household are largest in the 
Amhara region, while oil crop sales per household are largest in Tigray.  42 
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Share of Crop Production Sold 
Teff is the most commercialized cereal. Nationally, teff producers sold an average of about 24 percent of 
their production (Table 8). There was considerable variability among regions, with 49 percent of teff 
production sold on average in SNNP but only about 8 percent sold in Tigray. For wheat, 17 percent of 
production was sold on average nationally, with the largest proportion (27 percent) sold in SNNP and the 
smallest (8 percent) in Amhara. For barley, only 10 percent of production was sold nationally, with the 
largest proportion (16 percent) sold in SNNP and the smallest proportion (5 percent) in Amhara. For 
maize, on average, 8 percent of production was sold nationally, with the largest proportion (12 percent) 
sold in SNNP and the smallest proportion (4 percent) in Tigray. For sorghum, 9 percent of production on 
average was sold nationally, with the largest proportion (10 percent) in Oromia and the smallest 
proportion (7 percent) in SNNP.  44 
Table 8. Commercialization level of cereal crops (% sold) 
Cereal crop  Indicator  TIGRAY  AMHARA OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Teff Mean  8  18  21  49 24 
  Standard deviation (Std)  19  27  27  36  31 
Barley Mean  9  5  14  16  10 
 Std  22  16  26  30  23 
Wheat Mean  9  8  20  27  17 
 Std  21  16  27  29  25 
Maize Mean  4  6  9  12  8 
 Std  16  15  19  25  20 
Sorghum Mean  9  8  10  7  9 
 Std  20  19  20  20  19 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA survey 2005. 
Among the pulse crops, 38 percent of lentils, 22 percent of grass peas, and 20 percent of horse 
beans were sold, with considerable variability among regions (Table 9). On average, 18 percent of field 
pea production, 17 percent of chickpeas, and 13 percent of haricot beans were sold.  
Table 9. Commercialization level of pulse crops (% sold) 
Pulses Indicators  TIGRAY  AMHARA OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Horse  beans  Mean  13 14 18 38 20 
  Standard deviation (Std)  15  25  34  44  33 
Lentils  Mean  19 45 29 25 36 
  Std  36 41 39 43 41 
Chickpea  Mean  20 12 17 11 17 
  Std  31 21 26 27 25 
Field  pea  Mean  11 11 22 29 18 
  Std  23 24 33 37 31 
Haricot beans  Mean    14  20  6  13 
  Std    25 36 18 27 
Grass pea  Mean  8  13  31    22 
 Std  16  25  37    31 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA survey 2005.  
Oil crop production is more commercialized than cereals and pulses (Table 10). Sesame and nueg 
are the most commercialized of the oil crops, with about 61 percent of sesame production and 56 percent 
of nueg production sold in markets nationally, followed by groundnuts (48 percent), linseed (47 percent), 
and sunflower seed (16 percent). As for other crops, commercialization levels of oil crops vary 
considerably across regions.  45 
Table 10. Commercialization level of oil crops (% sold) 
Oil crop  Indicators  TIGRAY  AMHARA  OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Linseed Mean  36  24  59  51  47 
  Standard deviation (Std)  40  37  40  48  42 
Groundnut Mean  50    41 17  48 
 Std  71    43  29  32 
Sesame Mean  61  49  63    61 
 Std  36  39  36    38 
Sunflower Mean   19   25  16 
 Std    33    50  31 
Nueg Mean  55  48  57  95  56 
 Std  48  39  42  15  41 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA Survey 2005. 
Among horticultural crops, tomatoes, carrots, beet roots and onions are the most commercialized 
nationally, with 65 percent of the tomatoes produced, 62 percent of the carrots, 47 percent of the beet 
roots and 42 percent of the onions sold nationally but with considerable variability across regions (Table 
11). Other horticultural crops appear to be produced primarily for home consumption.  
Table 11. Commercialization of horticultural crops (% sold) 
Horticultural  crop    TIGRAY AMHARA OROMIA  SNNP  National 
Potato Mean  46  12  15  2  13 
 Standard  deviation(Std)  44  22  28  12  26 
Onion Mean  37  43  29  64  42 
 Std  42  43  41  44  44 
Tomato Mean  67  44  46  –  65 
 Std  29  45  47  –  40 
Sweet potato  Mean  –  35  37  14  19 
 Std  –  48  40  26  31 
Beet root  Mean  –  40  47  14  47 
 Std  –  42  45  24  43 
Cabbage Mean  –  41  12  14  17 
 Std  –  46  28  29  33 
Carrot Mean  87  36  67  50  62 
 Std  19  45  47  58  43 
Ginger Mean  – – –  44 8 
 Std  – – –  50 26 
Pepper Mean  19  10  23  38  19 
 Std  39  27  39  43  36 
Garlic Mean  36  14  22  41  22 
 Std  44  29  38  47  37 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA survey 2005. 46 
Net Market Positions 
Subsistence production is quite common among cereal crop producers, with more than half of barley, 
maize, and sorghum producers and nearly half of teff and wheat producers nationwide being autarkic in 
these crops (Table 12).  
Table 12. Market position of cereal crop producers (% of producing farmers) 
Cereal crop  Market position  TIGRAY AMHARA OROMIA SNNP National 
Teff Autarky  68.2  50.4  44.0  36.9  47.3 
 Only  seller  14.7  39.1 38.6  51.1  38.9 
 Net  seller  1.1  1.7  4.5  6.7  3.4 
 Only  buyer  15.0  8.2  12.2  5.3  9.8 
 Net  buyer  1.1  0.7  0.6  0.0  0.6 
Maize Autarky  57.1  62.4  49.7  46.0  52.2 
 Only  seller  5.3  16.8  10.6  10.9  12.0 
 Net  seller  0.9  0.9  2.7  3.7  2.4 
 Only  buyer  35.8  19.7  36.0  37.4  32.3 
 Net  buyer  0.8  0.2  0.9  2.0  1.1 
Wheat Autarky  41.9  57.0  48.8  39.2  49.1 
 Only  seller  14.9  22.8 33.5  36.0  29.1 
 Net  seller  0.9  1.1  3.6  2.5  2.4 
 Only  buyer  39.1  17.7  13.5  21.4  18.2 
 Net  buyer  3.3  1.5  0.6  0.8  1.1 
Barley Autarky  63.6  38.3  57.6  58.0  62.7 
 Only  seller  14.0  15.2 24.7  21.3  19.2 
 Net  seller  0.3  1.0  3.0  2.8  1.9 
 Only  buyer  21.0  14.9  14.3  16.9  15.6 
 Net  buyer  1.0  0.6  0.5  0.9  0.6 
Sorghum Autarky  47.2  42.4  56.0  38.7  54.4 
 Only  seller  16.8  26.1  15.1  6.4  16.2 
 Net  seller  1.4  1.1  0.6  0.8  0.9 
 Only  buyer  34.2  27.3  26.9  19.6  26.9 
 Net  buyer  0.4  3.2  1.4  0.6  1.6 
Source:  IFPRI/CSA survey 2005. 
Autarkic production of teff is most common in Tigray and least in SNNP. About two-fifths of teff 
producers were sellers of teff in 2004/05; some both bought and sold teff but the vast majority only sold. 
Teff sales are most common in the SNNP region and least common in Tigray. About 10 percent of teff 
producers were buyers, with only a few of these both selling and buying teff. Teff buyers are most 
common in Tigray and Oromia.  47 
Autarkic production of maize is most common in Amhara and Tigray. Maize buyers are more 
common than sellers, with about 33 percent of maize producers being buyers, while only 14 percent are 
sellers (net and only combined). As with teff, few households both buy and sell maize. Maize sellers are 
most common in Amhara and least in Tigray, while maize buyers are most common in SNNP, Oromia, 
and Tigray and least common in Amhara.  
Autarkic production of wheat is most common in Amhara and least in SNNP. Nearly one-third of 
wheat producers are sellers, while about one-fifth are buyers. Few households both sell and buy wheat. 
Selling wheat is most common in SNNP and least in Tigray, while buying wheat is most common in 
Tigray and least in Oromia. 
Autarkic production of barley is most common in Tigray and least in Amhara. About one-fifth of 
barley producers are sellers, with the largest proportion in Oromia and the smallest in Tigray. About 16 
percent of barley producers are buyers, with the largest proportion in Tigray and the smallest in Oromia. 
Few households are both buyers and sellers of barley. 
Autarkic production of sorghum is most common in Oromia and least common in SNNP. About 
17 percent of sorghum producers are sellers, with the largest proportion in Amhara and the smallest in 
SNNP. About 28 percent of sorghum producers are buyers of sorghum, with the largest proportion in 
Tigray and the smallest in SNNP. Few households both buy and sell sorghum. 
In general, teff and wheat are less often produced for subsistence alone and more commonly sold 
than other cereals, while maize and sorghum are more commonly purchased than other cereals. Barley is 
often produced by autarkic households,  but autarky is common for all cereals. Cereal producers are 
generally more likely to engage in selling in higher rainfall areas such as SNNP  and Oromia (except for 
sorghum) and least likely to be sellers in Tigray, where production is  more marginal. Few households 
both buy and sell any type of cereal.  
Differences across Households by Market Positions 
Statistics describing the net market positions of producers of teff and maize are presented in Table 13, 
using the dependent and explanatory variables of the econometric analysis.
26  As expected, sellers of teff 
and maize produce the largest quantities of these cereals, followed by autarkic households, with buying 
households producing the least. 
                                                 
26 In Table 13 and the remainder of the paper, we combine sellers only and net sellers into one category of net sellers, and 
buyers only and net buyers into one category of net buyers, recognizing that the vast majority of net sellers are sellers only and 
the vast majority of net buyers are buyers only. 48 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics by net market position of teff and maize producers 
Teff market position  Maize market position 
Autarky  Net Seller  Net Buyer  Autarky  Net Seller  Net Buyer 
 
 
Variable  Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Dependent variables                 
Teff/maize net market position among 
producers (number)  1256    1091   271   2302    618    1438   
Teff/maize production (kg)  195.4  233.5 476.1  521.8 174.7  219.5 240.1 386.5 766.5 710.4 210.2 327.9 
Teff/maize sold after harvest (kg.)  0.0  0.0 143.2  201.7  21.2  74.4  0.0  0.0 190.0 275.4  8.4  33.0 
Teff/maize purchased after harvest (kg.)  0.0  0.0 10.8  93.6 78.1  395.0  0.0  0.0 13.7 50.5  156.5  562.6 
Explanatory variables                 
Local teff/maize harvest price(EB/quintal(qq))
27  207.3  49.3 205.8  41.7 205.1  49.1 102.1  38.2  94.0  31.8 116.5  40.8 
Local price of DAP (Ethiopian Birr (EB)/kg)   3.227  0.486 3.263  0.477 3.234  0.442 3.277 0.468 3.320 0.467 3.198 0.488 
Value of assets owned (EB)                 
- Livestock  3305.3  3481.6 3434.8  3035.8 2752.6  2401.9 3471.0 6651.5 3448.2 4063.0 2811.1 5173.8 
- Farm equipment  252.0  1894.7 146.6  829.6 131.5  220.4 191.4  1425.5 137.2 555.2 122.4 776.8 
- Transportation assets  6.8  99.8  6.7  83.1 13.7  159.6 30.9  949.7  222.7  5229.8 11.5  117.1 
Distance to nearest (km)                 
- All-weather road  12.82  19.78  8.97  8.50  9.06  9.37 11.98 15.24 10.69 11.50 11.01 13.24 
- Sales market (km)  9.17  8.29  9.23 9.30  10.61 9.11  10.13  13.23  9.41  8.88  10.68  12.05 
Number of traders known outside PA  4.70  13.60 7.11  21.51 5.65  13.27 5.86  19.15 5.42 7.92 5.30  13.20 
Member of a cooperative  0.135  0.342 0.154  0.361 0.148  0.355 0.093 0.290 0.129 0.336 0.081 0.272 
Member of a credit or savings institution  0.425  0.495 0.604  0.489 0.421  0.495 0.447 0.497 0.542 0.499 0.476 0.500 
Proportion of adults with primary activity:                 
- Crop production  0.516  0.322 0.508  0.315 0.462  0.331 0.475 0.332 0.502 0.321 0.430 0.323 
- Livestock production  0.083  0.163 0.072  0.141 0.075  0.139 0.081 0.174 0.065 0.148 0.101 0.196 
- Domestic activities  0.158  0.220 0.190  0.228 0.207  0.271 0.199 0.247 0.190 0.238 0.223 0.251 
-  Non-farm  activities  0.017  0.083 0.016  0.080 0.010  0.057 0.021 0.109 0.012 0.073 0.024 0.108 
 
                                                 
27 1 quintal (qq) = 100 kg. 49 
Table 13. Continued 
Teff market position  Maize market position 
Autarky  Net Seller  Net Buyer  Autarky  Net Seller  Net Buyer 
 
 
Variable  Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Mean  Std 
Dev.
Proportion of labor force that is                   
-  Women  0.441  0.203  0.438 0.202 0.491  0.245  0.456 0.218 0.456 0.204  0.479 0.223 
-  Children  0.149  0.198  0.141 0.190 0.133  0.192  0.140 0.197 0.139 0.200  0.149 0.202 
Male  head  of  household  0.855  0.352  0.859 0.348 0.801  0.400  0.828 0.377 0.851 0.356  0.801 0.399 
Age  of  household  head  45.7  15.0  43.3 14.9 46.2  15.7  44.5 15.3 41.9 14.5  44.6 15.0 
Number  of  working  age  family  members  2.779  1.262  2.853 1.370 2.657  1.272  2.695 1.331 2.715 1.276  2.685 1.277 
Area  of  land  operated  (ha)  1.813  1.426  2.057 1.564 1.587  1.240  1.542 1.367 1.772 1.407  1.121 0.998 
Primary  or  secondary  education  of                   
-  Women  in  household  0.192  0.271  0.187 0.277 0.224  0.304  0.178 0.270 0.205 0.289  0.169 0.261 
-  Men  in  household  0.340  0.338  0.349 0.344 0.355  0.343  0.335 0.345 0.379 0.349  0.339 0.346 
Proportion  of  operated  land  that  is                     
-  Gently  sloping  0.356  0.389  0.251 0.341 0.322  0.373  0.321 0.392 0.306 0.392  0.328 0.407 
-  Steeply  sloping  0.046  0.156  0.043 0.150 0.035  0.124  0.061 0.195 0.026 0.121  0.044 0.170 
-  Mixed  slopes  0.048  0.172  0.057 0.204 0.062  0.190  0.061 0.213 0.034 0.161  0.045 0.180 
- Lem  (high  quality)  soil  0.427  0.422  0.439 0.415 0.323  0.384  0.503 0.444 0.645 0.416  0.457 0.452 
- Teuf  (low  quality)  soil  0.156  0.303  0.096 0.220 0.195  0.339  0.085 0.231 0.048 0.160  0.107 0.269 
- In dega  (high  altitude)  zone  0.182  0.366  0.092 0.267 0.334  0.461  0.135 0.327 0.164 0.354  0.135 0.332 
- In woina dega  (medium  altitude)  zone  0.478  0.476  0.570 0.470 0.424  0.475  0.501 0.482 0.513 0.483  0.538 0.485 
-  Irrigable  0.017  0.082  0.019 0.084 0.026  0.091  0.030 0.133 0.032 0.145  0.039 0.153 
-  Far  (>  1  hour  walk)  from  residence  0.078  0.195  0.070 0.191 0.082  0.217  0.072 0.198 0.048 0.166  0.048 0.166 
Proportion  of  households  by  region                   
-  Tigray    0.212  0.409  0.053 0.224 0.221  0.416  0.084 0.278 0.036 0.185  0.099 0.299 
-  Amhara    0.361  0.480  0.333 0.471 0.284  0.452  0.234 0.424 0.241 0.428  0.118 0.323 
-  Oromia  0.299  0.458  0.354 0.478 0.417  0.494  0.354 0.478 0.361 0.481  0.397 0.489 
-  SNNP  0.110  0.313  0.208 0.406 0.077  0.268  0.220 0.414 0.246 0.431  0.304 0.460 
- Addis Ababa  0.001  0.028  0.028 0.166 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.026 50 
Average local harvest prices for teff vary little across households with different market positions 
for teff, while local maize harvest prices are lowest for sellers, intermediate for autarkic households, and 
highest for buying households, as would be expected. Fertilizer (DAP) prices vary little across these 
groups but are slightly higher for sellers of both teff and maize, perhaps reflecting greater fertilizer 
demand in communities where there are more cereal sales. 
As expected, buyers of both teff and maize have less land area than sellers or autarkic households, 
while sellers farm the most land. Teff sellers also tend to farm better quality land—more lem or mixed 
soils—with a smaller proportion of their land on slopes or in the high altitude dega zone. The situation is 
similar for maize sellers, except that maize sellers have a higher proportion of their land in the dega zone 
than autarkic or buying households. Teff sellers have a smaller proportion of the land far from their 
residences than do buyers or autarkic households, while a smaller share of the land of both maize buyers 
and sellers is far from their residences than is the case for autarkic households. Interestingly, a somewhat 
larger share of land of teff and maize buyers is irrigable (has access to irrigation but may not be irrigated 
in any given year) than that of sellers or autarkic households, although the irrigable share of land is small 
(only about 2 to 4 percent) for all groups. Perhaps cereal buyers use irrigation for producing other higher-
value crops, rather than for irrigating maize. 
Teff buyers are poorer on average than teff sellers or autarkic households in terms of ownership 
of livestock and farm equipment, though they own slightly more transportation assets. Maize buyers are 
poorer than maize sellers or autarkic households in terms of transportation assets as well as livestock and 
equipment.  
As expected, teff and maize sellers and buyers live closer to an all-weather road on average than 
autarkic households. Maize sellers also live closer to the nearest sales market than other maize producers, 
while teff sellers and autarkic households live somewhat closer to the nearest market than buyers on 
average. 
Teff sellers know more traders outside of their PA than either buyers or autarkic households, on 
average, and are more likely to be members of a cooperative (followed in both cases by teff buyers). 
Maize sellers are also more likely to be members of a cooperative than autarkic households or buyers, but 
know fewer traders than autarkic households. Both teff and maize sellers are more likely to be members 
of a credit or savings institution than buyers or autarkic households. 
There are also differences in human capital across these groups. Maize-selling households have a 
larger share of members with formal (primary or secondary) education than autarkic or buying 
households, while teff buyers have a slightly larger share of educated members on average than the other 
two groups. Teff and maize-selling households are somewhat more likely to be headed by males than the 
other groups; they have more working- age adults, have a slightly larger share of men in the household 51 
labor force, and the head tends to be younger. Maize-selling households tend to be more focused on crop 
production and less on livestock production, domestic activities, or nonfarm activities than other maize 
producers. Teff sellers also tend to be more oriented toward crop production than teff buyers, while 
autarkic teff producers have a similar degree of focus on crop production as the primary activity.  
These descriptive results suggest that teff and maize sellers tend to have several advantages, 
compared with buyers and autarkic households, particularly in terms of access to and quality of land, 
endowments of physical and financial capital and some types of social and human capital, and access to 
roads and markets. These differences have important implications for policies that affect cereal crop 
production and prices. For example, policies that increase cereal productivity and reduce cereal prices 
should unambiguously benefit net buyers of cereals, who tend to be poorer than sellers in many respects. 
The effects of improvements in productivity are also likely to be favorable for the large share of 
producers who are autarkic, while market price declines are irrelevant to autarkic households unless they 
are large enough to induce such households to become net buyers (which would benefit autarkic 
households ). The impacts of increased productivity and lower prices on sellers are more ambiguous, as 
they depend on the price elasticity of demand (in other words, sellers revenues may fall as a result of 
increased production if demand is price-inelastic) and the extent to which sellers’ costs of production fall. 
Thus, policies to promote increased cereal productivity and hence lower prices are likely to have 
beneficial distributional as well as efficiency effects, although some cereal-selling households may be 
worse off as a result.  
 In order to draw further policy-relevant implications, we need to assess the extent to which the 
factors discussed here affect farmers’ production and marketing decisions, accounting for the 
simultaneous influence of multiple factors. That is the objective of the econometric analysis presented in 
the next section. 
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5.  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
In this section we discuss the econometric results for teff and maize, including the determinants of market 
position, production, and the amount of sales or purchases of each crop. Teff and maize were selected for 
this analysis because they are the two most important crops in Ethiopia in terms of area planted and the 
value of production. For this analysis, we have 1,635 teff-producing households and 2,072 maize-
producing households with a complete set of data for all variables. Here we have combined sellers only 
and net sellers and buyers only and net buyers to reduce the number of categories, and because few 
households in the sample both sell and buy teff or maize. Nearly half of the teff producers in the sample 
are teff sellers and only a tenth are buyers, with the remainder autarkic. By contrast, only about one-fifth 
of the maize producers are sellers, nearly half of which are autarkic, with the remaining third being 
buyers. To be consistent with the empirical model, the analysis focuses on crop sales and purchases 
during the postharvest period only.  
Econometric Results for Teff 
Determinants of Teff Market Position 
The estimation results for determinants of market position for teff are reported in Table 14. The model 
predicts the mean probabilities of the different market positions quite well. For example, the mean 
predicted probability of being a seller or a buyer is 0.4895 and 0.1016, respectively; quite close to the 
mean proportions of sellers and buyers in the sample of 0.4887 and 0.1011, respectively. However, the 
ability of the model to discriminate different probabilities for households that take different market 
positions is limited. For example, among teff-selling households, the predicted probability of selling teff 
is 0.5670, while it is 0.3595 among buying households and 0.4294 among autarkic households. Thus, the 
discriminating power or “fit” of the model is far from perfect. Nevertheless, the model does reveal several 
factors that significantly affect households’ market position for teff.  
Variables found to significantly affect sellers’ transaction costs (at the 5 percent level) include 
distance to an all-weather road (positive effect [+]) and the number of traders outside the PA known by 
the respondent (negative effect [–]). Both of these impacts are as hypothesized. None of the explanatory 
variables have a statistically significant impact on buyers’ transaction costs. This may be due to the 
weaker statistical power of the model and data to identify these effects, given the relatively small number 
of teff buyers in the estimation sample (165). 
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Table 14. Determinants of market position for teff 
Marginal effects 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Err.  P(seller)
28 P(buyer)  P(autarky)
Sellers’ transaction costs (βs)    
Ln (value of transportation assets)  -0.002 0.110 0.0006  0.1023  -0.1029
Ln (distance to all-weather road)  0.166** 0.072 -0.0451  0.0483  -0.0032
Ln (minimum distance to sales market)  -0.146 0.091 0.0397  0.0883  -0.1280
Ln (number of traders known outside PA)  -0.153** 0.071 0.0414  0.0544  -0.0959
Member of a cooperative  -0.048 0.191 0.0130  -0.1909  0.1779
Constant (βs0) 3.457*** 1.040    
    
Buyers’ transaction costs (βb)    
Ln(value of transportation assets)  -0.200 0.143    
Ln(distance to all-weather road)  -0.094 0.073    
Ln(minimum distance to sales market)  -0.172 0.109    
Ln(number of traders known outside PA)  -0.106 0.084    
Member of a cooperative  0.373 0.311    
    
Shadow price of teff (βp)    
Ln(price of DAP)  -1.271*** 0.468 0.3446  -0.6505  0.3059
Proportion of adults in household with primary activity
 (cf., proportion of crop producers)  
  
- Livestock production  0.252 0.390 -0.0684  0.1292  -0.0607
- Domestic activities  0.491* 0.291 -0.1331  0.2513  -0.1181
- Nonfarm enterprise  0.534 0.634 -0.1448  0.2733  -0.1285
Ln(total number of workers in household)  0.017 0.211 -0.0046  0.0086  -0.0041
Proportion of labor force (cf., men)     
- Women  0.659* 0.388 -0.1788  0.3375  -0.1587
- Children  0.090 0.347 -0.0243  0.0459  -0.0216
Male head of household  0.415* 0.216 -0.1125  0.2123  -0.0998
Ln(age of household head)  0.556** 0.226 -0.1507  0.2845  -0.1338
Primary or secondary education of women  0.481* 0.259 -0.1306  0.2464  -0.1159
Primary or secondary education of men  0.289 0.189 -0.0783  0.1477  -0.0695
Ln(area of land operated)  -0.228** 0.116 0.0619  -0.1168  0.0549
Land quality characteristics     
Slope of land (cf., flat land)     
- Proportion of land gently sloping  0.515** 0.226 -0.1396  0.2635  -0.1239
- Proportion of land steeply sloping  -0.068 0.387 0.0184  -0.0347  0.0163
                                                 
28 P(seller) means probability of being a seller, etc. 54 
Table 14. Continued 
     Marginal  effects 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Err.  P(seller)
29 P(buyer)  P(autarky)
Soil quality     
- Proportion of land with lem soil   0.052 0.148 -0.0140  0.0265  -0.0125
- Proportion of land with teuf soil  0.318 0.266 -0.0862  0.1626  -0.0765
Agroecology (altitude zone)     
- Proportion of land in dega (high alt.) zone  1.258*** 0.463 -0.3412  0.6440  -0.3028
- Proportion of land in woina dega (medium alt.)  0.064 0.149 -0.0174  0.0329  -0.0155
Proportion of land with access to irrigation 0.737 0.758 -0.1999 0.3774  -0.1775
Proportion of land far from residence  -0.459 0.439 0.1245  -0.2351  0.1105
Other productive assets     
Ln(value of livestock)  -0.086** 0.043 0.0232  -0.0439  0.0206
Ln(value of equipment)  -0.316*** 0.118 0.0858  -0.1619  0.0761
Member of credit or savings institution -0.134 0.140 0.0363  -0.0685  0.0322
Region (cf., Tigray)     
- Amhara  -1.185*** 0.369 0.3214  -0.6067  0.2853
- Oromia  -1.291*** 0.379 0.3501  -0.6609  0.3107
- SNNP  -2.035*** 0.565 0.5518  -1.0416  0.4898
- Addis Ababa  -4.070*** 1.389 1.1039  -2.0837  0.9798
Constant (βp0) 3.493*** 1.071    
    
σp  1.810*** 0.529   
Number of observations  1635 795  165  675
Proportion of observations  0.4887  0.1011  0.4102
Mean predicted probability (entire estimation sample)  0.4895  0.1016  0.4089
Mean predicted probability (selling households)  0.5670  0.0707  0.3624
Mean predicted probability (buying households)  0.3595  0.1848  0.4556
Mean predicted probability (autarkic households)  0.4294  0.1178  0.4528
*, **, *** mean that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively. 
Explanatory variables having a statistically significant impact (5 percent level, or less) on the 
shadow price of teff include the price of DAP (–), the age of the household head (+), the area of land 
operated (–), the proportion of land that is gently sloping (+), the proportion of land in the dega (high-
altitude) zone (+), the value of livestock (–) and equipment (–) owned by the household, and the region 
(lower in all regions than in Tigray). Other variables having a weak statistically significant impact (10 
percent level) on the teff shadow price include the proportion of adults pursuing domestic activities (+), 
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the proportion of women in the household labor force (+), male head of household (+), and primary or 
secondary education of women in the household (+).  
Most of these results are consistent with the hypotheses from our theoretical model discussed in 
section 2. Productive assets that increase potential production of teff, such as a larger operated land area 
and ownership of livestock and equipment, lead to lower shadow prices, while factors that reduce teff 
productivity, such as sloping lands, higher elevation, and lower rainfall (as in Tigray), lead to higher 
shadow prices (see Table 1 and equation [41]). Factors that increase the opportunity costs of labor, such 
as the age of the household head and women’s education, also increase shadow prices.  
One unexpected finding is that a higher price of DAP fertilizer is associated with a lower shadow 
price of teff. This contradicts our hypothesis that higher input prices will increase crop shadow prices (see 
equation 41),
30 and suggests that other factors that are correlated with the DAP price may be responsible. 
For example, if the price of DAP is higher in more productive environments due to higher fertilizer 
demand in these environments, and the productivity of the environment is not adequately reflected by the 
agro-ecological variables included in the model, this omitted variable bias could explain why we find this 
unexpected result. Further research is needed to investigate this issue. 
Two other unexpected findings are that domestic work and women’s share of the household labor 
force have a statistically weak  but positive impact on the shadow price. If domestic work and women 
laborers are associated with lower wages and income, these would be expected to reduce teff consumption 
demand and hence reduce the shadow price of teff. However, if labor markets are not perfect (as assumed 
in the theoretical models) but rather segmented, involvement in domestic work and women’s share of the 
labor force could reduce the labor supply available for food production, effectively increasing the labor 
opportunity cost in food production and the shadow price of food. An alternative explanation is that 
women are more concerned with household food security and therefore have a greater demand for food 
than male household members, so that the demand for teff is greater in households with more female 
members, other factors being equal. Further research is necessary to assess the plausibility of either of 
these (or other) explanations for these results. 
To facilitate interpretation of the estimation results, the marginal effects of each variable on the 
predicted probability of households taking different market positions (evaluated at the means of the 
explanatory variables) are also reported in Table 14. We focus here on the marginal effects of selected 
variables that are statistically significant (at the 5 percent level). Increasing the distance to an all-weather 
road by 1 percent reduces the probability that a household with average characteristics is a seller by 
                                                 
30 Note that the relationship between the price of inputs and the shadow price of food is ambiguous in the more general 
theoretical model summarized in Table 1, so this result does not contradict a more general specification of the model. 56 
0.00045.
31  Increasing the number of traders known outside the PA by 1 percent increases the probability 
of being a seller by 0.00041. Increasing the area of land operated by the household by 1 percent increases 
the probability that it is a seller by 0.00062 and that it is autarkic by 0.00055, while reducing the 
probability that it is a buyer by 0.00117. Increasing the value of livestock owned by 1 percent increases 
the probability of being a seller or autarkic by 0.00020 each, while reducing the probability of being a 
buyer by 0.00040. Increasing the value of equipment owned by 1 percent has qualitatively similar but 
stronger impacts, increasing the probability of being a seller or autarkic by about 0.00080 each and 
reducing the probability of being a buyer by 0.00160. 
These results suggest that to promote more households to become sellers of teff, we should 
increase smallholders’ access to roads, land, equipment, livestock, and social connections with traders. 
However, the impacts of such improvements on teff commercialization would not be very large, unless 
the magnitude of improvements in access to these forms of capital is quite large. 
Determinants of Teff Production 
The determinants of teff production, estimated separately for sellers, buyers, and autarkic households, are 
reported in Table15. The models for sellers and buyers explain a substantial share of the variance in teff 
production (45 percent for sellers and 49 percent for buyers), despite using a relatively small number of 
explanatory variables, compared with the number of observations. The model for production by autarkic 
households does not fit the data as well, but still explains 28 percent of the variance in teff production. In 
the models for sellers and buyers, the selectivity correction term is highly statistically significant, 
indicating the importance of including this correction for these models to avoid selectivity bias.  
The factors found to significantly  influence teff production by teff sellers (at the 5 percent level) 
include the market price of teff (+), distance to an all-weather road (-), the number of traders known 
outside the PA (+), the importance of domestic activities in the household allocation of labor (-), the 
proportion of women in the household labor force (-), the age of the household head (-), the area of land 
operated (+), the proportion of land with gentle or mixed slopes (compared with flat land) (-), the 
proportion of land in the high-altitude dega zone (–), the value of livestock (+) and equipment (+) owned, 
and the region (higher in all regions than Tigray). Most of these results are consistent with our 
hypotheses; for example, the positive effects of market price, factors reducing transaction costs, 
productive capital, and agro-ecological potential (higher outside of Tigray, on flatter land, and at lower 
elevation). The age of the household head probably has a negative impact because older household heads 
                                                 
31 As defined in equations (59) to (64), the marginal effect (M) measures dP/dZ, where P is the probability of the market 
position (teff seller in this case) and Z is the explanatory variable (ln(distance to an all-weather road in this case). Defining the 
distance to an all-weather road as X, we have M = dP/dlnX, which implies dP = M dlnX = M dX/X. If M = 0.045 (the marginal 
effect of ln(distance to an all weather road) on P(teff seller) in Table 14), then a 1 percent change in X (dX/X = 0.01) implies dP 
= 0.045 x 0.01 = 0.00045. 57 
have higher labor opportunity costs,  which is consistent with the finding discussed above that older 
household heads have a higher shadow price of teff. The negative impacts of domestic activities and the 
share of women in the household labor force on teff production are also consistent with the positive 
impact that these factors have on the shadow price of teff and supports the explanation that these factors 
reduce the effective labor supply in teff production in the context of an imperfect labor market, resulting 
in higher labor opportunity costs, lower teff production, and a higher shadow price of teff.  
Table 15. Determinants of teff production, dependent variable ln(teff production) 
Sellers Buyers  Autarkic 
Variable  Coefficient Std.  Err.
a  Coefficient Std. Err.
a  Coefficient Std.  Err.
a 
Ln (market price of teff) 1.372*** 0.437 -3.341* 1.754
Ln (value of transportation assets)  0.066 0.094 0.613 0.694
Ln (distance to all-weather road)  -0.167** 0.071 0.392 0.328
Ln (minimum distance to sales market)  0.112 0.080 0.397 0.387
Ln (number of traders known outside PA)  0.152*** 0.052 0.571* 0.307
Member of a cooperative 0.033 0.160 -1.484 1.312
Ln (price of DAP)  0.699 0.529 -4.123* 2.493 -0.014 0.304
Proportion of adults in household with primary 
activity (cf. crop producers)  
- Livestock production  -0.460 0.392 1.614 1.822 0.351 0.296
- Domestic activities  -0.773*** 0.258 2.174** 1.063 -0.157 0.237
- Nonfarm enterprise  -1.124 0.699 1.854 2.775 -0.377 0.488
Proportion of labor force (cf., men) 
- Women  -0.798** 0.343 3.616** 1.522 -0.295 0.307
- Children  -0.290 0.334 0.992 1.442 -0.171 0.300
Male head of household  -0.319* 0.192 1.776** 0.890 0.123 0.173
Ln (age of household head)  -0.590** 0.252 2.102** 0.885 -0.030 0.159
Ln (total number of workers)  0.064 0.201 0.388 0.858 0.005 0.142
Ln (area of land operated) 0.468*** 0.133 -0.489 0.407 0.339*** 0.091
Member of credit or savings institution 0.224* 0.128 -0.568 0.641 0.022 0.103
Primary or secondary education of women  -0.501* 0.263 1.793* 0.930 0.096 0.169
Primary or secondary education of men  -0.127 0.213 1.371* 0.814 -0.243 0.163
Land quality characteristics 
Slope of land (cf., flat land) 
- Proportion of land gently sloping -0.740*** 0.239 1.170 0.867 -0.351** 0.165
- Proportion of land steeply sloping 0.310 0.339 -1.357 1.581 0.334 0.269
- Proportion of land with mixed slopes -0.821** 0.387 2.471 1.824 -0.222 0.311
Soil quality 
- Proportion of land with lem soil   -0.043 0.141 0.362 0.669 0.058 0.122
- Proportion of land with teuf soil  -0.318 0.272 1.717 1.046 0.375** 0.160
Agroecology (altitude zone) 58 
Table 15. Continued 
Sellers Buyers  Autarkic 
Variable  Coefficient Std.  Err.
a  Coefficient Std. Err.
a  Coefficient Std.  Err.
a 
- Proportion of land in dega (high alt.) zone  -1.306*** 0.491 4.091** 1.938 -0.491* 0.283
- Proportion of land in woina dega (medium)  -0.072 0.138 0.620 0.727 -0.064 0.104
Proportion of land with access to irrigation -1.048 0.857 1.601 3.228 0.523 0.577
Proportion of land far from residence 0.416 0.410 -3.237 2.030 -0.515 0.359
Other productive assets 
Ln (value of livestock)  0.170*** 0.064 -0.167 0.171 0.084*** 0.031
Ln (value of equipment)  0.515*** 0.125 -1.051** 0.467 0.124 0.079
Region (cf., Tigray) 
- Amhara  2.172*** 0.543 -3.859** 1.897 1.114*** 0.216
- Oromia  2.497*** 0.587 -4.301** 1.991 1.043*** 0.231
- SNNP  2.413*** 0.828 -7.678*** 2.964 0.243 0.337
- Addis Ababa  3.913*** 0.975 (dropped) 1.742* 0.987
Selectivity correction   -2.684*** 0.999 7.751** 3.395 0.485 0.398
Intercept -7.164* 3.678 6.754 7.487 3.382*** 0.654
Number of observations  795 165  675
R
2 0.4474 0.4893  0.2811
a Based on 100 bootstrap replications. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively. 
Other factors having a statistically weak (10 percent level) impact on sellers’ teff production 
include the gender of the household head (– for male headed households), membership in a credit or 
savings institution (+), and education of women (–). The negative effects of male-headed households and 
education of women may be due to such factors causing higher labor opportunity costs, while the positive 
impact of membership in a credit or savings institution may be because such organizations provide credit 
at a lower rate of interest (Table 1) or relax binding credit constraints (Table 2).  
There are many differences between the factors influencing teff production by teff sellers and 
those influencing production by teff buyers. For buyers, factors having a statistically significant impact on 
production include the importance of domestic activities (+), share of women in the household labor 
supply (+), male head of household (+), age of the household head (+), share of land in the dega zone (+), 
the value of equipment owned (–), and the region (greater production by buyers in Tigray than in other 
regions). Factors having a weakly significant (10 percent level) impact include the market price of teff (–
), the number of traders known outside the PA (+), the price of DAP (–), education of women (+), and 
education of men (+). Most of these factors have an opposite effect on production by sellers:  teff price, 
domestic activities, share of women in the labor force, gender and age of the household head, education of 
women, altitude, ownership of equipment, and the region are all opposite signs from those for the buyers , 
and many of these impacts are contrary to our expectations.  59 
These results confirm our assertion that the same factors can have different impacts on production 
incentives for buyers versus sellers. However, we expected this only for factors that influence transaction 
costs, assuming that higher transaction costs would give sellers less incentive to produce but buyers more 
incentive. Although some of the factors found to have differential effects on production of buyers versus 
sellers could influence transaction costs (education of women, for example), most are not clearly related 
to transaction costs. Moreover, the variables that we expected to be most directly related to transaction 
costs—such as distance to the nearest market or road, ownership of transportation assets, number of 
traders known, or membership in a cooperative—had either insignificant effects on buyers or the same 
impacts on buyers and sellers (the number of traders known, for example). It may be that teff buyers are 
motivated to produce teff primarily for subsistence motives, and that these motives are stronger for poorer 
and more vulnerable households who have a larger share of women in the labor force, are more involved 
in domestic activities, whose head is older, who live at higher elevations, or in lower rainfall regions, or 
who own less equipment. By contrast, among households who produce enough teff for their own 
subsistence and a surplus for sales, such poverty-related factors have the more expected negative effects. 
Further research to investigate the robustness of these findings and probe the reasons behind these 
unexpected differences would be useful. 
For households that are autarkic in teff production and consumption, the factors found to 
significantly affect teff production include the area of land operated (+), the proportion of land that is 
sloping (–), the proportion of land with teuf (low quality) soil (+), the proportion of land in the dega zone 
(–, weakly significant), the value of livestock owned (+), and the region (greater production in Amhara, 
Oromia, and  Addis Ababa (weakly significant) than in Tigray). These results are similar to many of the 
results for households selling (but not buying) teff. As expected, we find that factors that increase 
potential production, such as the amount and quality of land owned, livestock ownership, and rainfall, 
contribute to greater teff production and consumption by autarkic households. The positive coefficient for 
lower-quality teuf soil is unexpected, however.  
Determinants of Teff Sales and Purchases 
The nonlinear least-squares-regression results for teff sales and purchases are reported in Table 16. We 
were unable to estimate the model for purchases including the selectivity correction term and several 
explanatory variables (the model failed to converge), so these were dropped from this model. The fit of 
these regressions is fairly high, especially for purchases (R
2 = 0.91).  
The only variable found to have a statistically significant impact in the sales regression was teff 
production. The coefficient of this variable (0.818) indicates that teff sellers consume less that 20 percent 
of each additional unit of teff production and sell more than 80 percent of additional production. This 60 
emphasizes the market orientation of teff sellers. Factors expected to affect household demand for teff 
(controlling for teff production), such as the size and composition of the household, have insignificant 
impacts. These findings suggest that the most effective way to increase teff commercialization by 
households who are already selling teff is to increase their productivity. 





Variable  Coeff. Std.  error
b  Coeff. Std.  error
b 
Teff production  0.818*** 0.301 -0.176*** 0.040
Ln (market price of teff) 0.585 108.078 -8.971 47.138
Ln (value of transportation assets) 
Ln (dist to all weather road)  -0.087 17.291 21.517 14.038
Ln (minimum distance to sales market)  -0.066 47.662
Ln (number of traders known outside PA)  0.154 63.400 -3.526 12.748
Member of a cooperative -0.114 3337.688 -28.445 147.928
Ln (price of DAP)  0.125 355.659 -31.687 60.291
Proportion of adults in household with primary 
activity (cf. crop producers)  
- Livestock production  -0.343 95.898 99.737 79.333
- Domestic activities  -1.104 230.593 -15.989 43.255
- Non-farm enterprise 
Proportion of labor force (cf., men) 
- Women  -1.119 153.921 -19.720 92.244
- Children  -1.106 166.491 107.412 75.056
Male head of household  -0.235 45.359 22.582 30.003
Ln (age of household head)  -0.547 77.264 -103.95*** 40.184
Ln (total number of workers)  0.371 19.092 57.280 45.157
Ln (area of land operated) 0.455 16.674 23.093 14.910
Member of credit or savings institution  0.075 91.388 28.896 28.657
Primary or secondary education of women  -0.219 44.527 55.551 37.345
Primary or secondary education of men  -0.379 180.319 20.890 38.880
Land quality characteristics 
Slope of land (cf., flat land) 
- Proportion of land gently sloping  -0.327 31.128
- Proportion. of land steeply sloping  0.708 6530.796
- Proportion of land with mixed slopes  -0.209 1.584E+06
Soil quality 
- Proportion of land with lem soil   -0.147 41.093 26.693 25.363
- Proportion of land with teuf soil  -0.310 213.307 -32.901 49.086
Agroecology (altitude zone) 
- Proportion of land in dega (high alt.) zone  -0.727 1.261E+05 53.816* 30.42861 





Variable  Coeff. Std.  error
b Coeff.  Std.  error
b
- Proportion of land in woina dega (medium)  -0.147 101.174 20.262 29.628
- Proportion of land with access to irrigation 
- Proportion of land far from residence 0.164 468.308 -84.086 9.896E+06
Other productive assets 
Ln (value of livestock) 0.107 1.479E+05 -5.875 8.387
Ln (value of equipment)  0.445 82.088 12.324* 6.987
Region (cf., Tigray) 
- Amhara  1.469 216.622 -14.932 40.023
- Oromia  1.528 235.361 -1.519 31.449
- SNNP 
- Addis Ababa  2.566 449.544
Selectivity correction (σsρps) -18.457 3.440E+10
a a
Intercept (δ0) -0.359 444.688 211.459 270.492
Number of observations  728 102
R
2  0.3384 0.9067
a Nonlinear least squares model for purchases failed to converge after 4000 iterations with selectivity correction included, so this 
parameter was dropped from the estimation. 
bBased on 100 bootstrap replications. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively. 
For teff buyers, the factors significantly influencing the amount purchased include teff production 
(–), the age of the household head (–), the proportion of land in the dega zone (+, weakly significant), and 
value of equipment owned (+, weakly significant). The coefficient of teff production (–0.176) indicates 
that increased teff production by teff buyers has only limited impact on teff purchases; households 
consume more than 80 percent of an increase in production. This is consistent with the argument made 
above that teff buyers are poorer households facing severe food supply constraints; they consume nearly 
all of any increase in production..  
The negative coefficient of age of household head is unexpected, since we expect older household 
heads to demand more  teff because their wages or other sources of income are higher. The  weak positive 
impact of higher elevation on teff purchases is inconsistent with the earlier finding that teff buyers in the 
dega zone produce more teff, but it is consistent with our expectation of lower productivity in this zone 
(and the production results for sellers and autarkic households). The (weakly significant) positive impact 
of value of equipment on purchases is inconsistent with our theoretical predictions (see Tables 1 and 2). 
We do not have any convincing explanations to offer for these inconsistencies, which may be simply a 
result of statistical errors.  62 
Econometric Results for Maize 
In this section we discuss the econometric results for maize market position, production, sales, and 
purchases.  
Determinants of Maize Market Position 
The determinants of maize market position are reported in Table 17. As for teff, the model accurately 
predicts the mean probabilities of each market position but is limited in its ability to discriminate different 
predicted probabilities for households taking different market positions. For example, the mean predicted 
probability of maize sales among maize sellers is only 0.27, while the predicted probability of maize sales 
is 0.14 for maize buyers and 0.20 for autarkic households.  
Table 17. Determinants of market position for maize, maximum likelihood estimation 
Marginal effects 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Err.  P(seller) P(buyer)  P(autarky) 
Sellers’ transaction costs (βs)    
Ln (value of transportation assets)  -0.047 0.036 0.008  0.023  -0.031
Ln (dist to all weather road)  0.047** 0.022 -0.008  -0.010  0.017
Ln (minimum distance to sales market)  -0.034 0.038 0.006  -0.023  0.017
Ln (number of traders known outside PA)  -0.033 0.029 0.005  -0.024  0.019
Member of a cooperative  -0.227** 0.115 0.037  -0.122  0.085
Constant (βs0) 1.336*** 0.095    
    
Buyers’ transaction costs (βb)    
Ln (value of transportation assets)  -0.034 0.037    
Ln (dist to all weather road)  0.014 0.021    
Ln (minimum distance to sales market)  0.033 0.034    
Ln (number of traders known outside PA)  0.035 0.026    
Member of a cooperative  0.181* 0.110    
    
Shadow price of maize (βp)    
Ln (price of DAP)  -0.253 0.184 0.042  -0.171  0.129
Proportion of adults in household with primary 
activity (cf., proportion crop producers)     
- Livestock production  0.245 0.180 -0.041  0.166  -0.125
- Domestic activities  0.223** 0.108 -0.037  0.151  -0.114
- Non-farm enterprise  0.431* 0.244 -0.071  0.292  -0.220
Ln (total number of workers in household)  0.147 0.108 -0.024  0.100  -0.075
Proportion of labor force (cf., men)     63 
Table 17. Continued 
Marginal effects 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Err. P(seller) P(buyer)  P(autarky)
- Women  0.154 0.168 -0.025  0.104  -0.079
- Children  0.088 0.176 -0.015  0.059  -0.045
Male head of household  0.080 0.085 -0.013  0.054  -0.041
Ln (age of household head)  0.265*** 0.084 -0.044  0.179  -0.135
Primary or secondary education of women  -0.048 0.095 0.008  -0.032  0.024
Primary or secondary education of men  0.050 0.085 -0.008  0.034  -0.025
Ln (area of land operated)  -0.301*** 0.037 0.050  -0.204  0.154
Land quality characteristics     
Slope of land (cf., flat land)     
- Proportion of land gently sloping  0.001 0.072 0.000  0.001  -0.001
- Proportion of land steeply sloping  0.248 0.165 -0.041  0.168  -0.127
- Proportion of land with mixed slopes  0.209 0.142 -0.035  0.141  -0.107
Soil quality     
- Proportion of land with lem soil   -0.181*** 0.067 0.030  -0.123  0.093
- Proportion of land with teuf soil  0.664*** 0.133 -0.110  0.449  -0.339
Agroecology (altitude zone)     
- Proportion of land in dega (high alt.) zone  -0.014 0.093 0.002  -0.009  0.007
- Proportion of land in woina dega (medium alt.)  -0.076 0.068 0.013  -0.052  0.039
Proportion of land with access to irrigation 0.750*** 0.254 -0.124 0.507  -0.383
Proportion of land far from residence  -0.045 0.162 0.007  -0.030  0.023
Other productive assets     
Ln (value of livestock)  -0.025* 0.014 0.004  -0.017  0.013
Ln (value of equipment)  -0.039 0.027 0.006  -0.026  0.020
Member of credit or savings institution 0.095* 0.056 -0.016  0.064  -0.049
Region (cf., Tigray)     
- Amhara  -0.354** 0.161 0.059  -0.240  0.181
- Oromia  0.016 0.155 -0.003  0.011  -0.008
- SNNP  0.093 0.158 -0.015  0.063  -0.048
Constant (βp0) -1.062** 0.422    
σp  NE NE   
Number of observations  2072 383  714  975
Proportion of observations  0.1930  0.3341  0.4729
Mean predicted probability (entire estimation sample) 0.1925  0.3327  0.4748
Mean predicted probability (selling households)  0.2707  0.2419  0.4874
Mean predicted probability (buying households)  0.1414  0.4035  0.4551
Mean predicted probability (autarkic households)  0.1966  0.3198  0.4836
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively.64 
The factors found to affect sellers’ transaction costs, statistically significant at the 5 percent level, 
include distance to an all-weather road (+) and membership in a cooperative (–). These results are as 
hypothesized. Membership in a cooperative has an unexpected positive effect on buyers’ transaction 
costs, although this coefficient is only weakly statistically significant (10 percent level). 
The factors that significantly affect the shadow price of maize (at the 5 percent level or better) 
include the importance of domestic activities in household labor allocation (+), age of the household head 
(+), area of land operated (–), soil quality (– for lem soil, + for teuf soil), access to irrigation (+), and 
region (lower in Amhara than Tigray). Variables that have weakly significant impacts (at the 10 percent 
level) on the shadow price include involvement in nonfarm activities (+), value of livestock owned (–), 
and membership in a savings or credit institution (+). Many of these results are similar to the results for 
teff, with factors that increase production potential such as land area operated, better quality soil, more 
livestock owned, and higher rainfall (which is higher in Amhara than Tigray) contributing to a lower 
maize shadow price, while factors reflecting labor constraints and higher labor opportunity costs, such as 
the importance of domestic or nonfarm activities and the age of the household head contributing to a 
higher shadow price.  
The positive coefficient for access to irrigation is a surprise, since we expected irrigation to 
increase maize productivity. This result could be due to use of irrigation for other higher-value crops, 
rather than for maize, which could lead to lower maize production among households with access to 
irrigation, or it could be that households with access to irrigation have a higher demand for maize, as a 
result of their increased income from irrigating high-value crops. The positive coefficient for membership 
in a credit or savings institution is also unexpected, but could arise for similar reasons (that is,  credit 
access may facilitate production of other crops of higher value than maize or other economic activities, 
increasing maize demand by increasing income). We investigate these issues further in the next section, in 
which we estimate the determinants of maize production. 
Considering the marginal effects shown in Table 17, we predict that being 1 percent farther from 
an all-weather road reduces the probability of a household (at the mean of the data) being a maize seller 
by 0.00008 and being a maize buyer by 0.00010, while increasing the probability of being autarkic by 
0.00017. Being a member of a cooperative is associated with a 0.037 higher probability of being a maize 
seller, a 0.085 higher probability of being autarkic in maize, and 0.122 lower probability of being a maize 
buyer. Having 1 percent more land increases the probability of being a maize seller by 0.0005 and the 
probability of being autarkic by 0.0015, while reducing the probability of being a buyer by 0.0020. 
Access to irrigation increases the probability of being a maize buyer by 0.507, while reducing the 
probability of being autarkic by 0.383 and the probability of being a seller by 0.124.  65 
These results suggest that improved access to roads, cooperatives, land, and livestock will tend to 
increase smallholders’ involvement in selling maize, although the impacts are likely to be relatively small 
without large changes in access to these assets and organizations. In contrast, increased access to 
irrigation may substantially reduce the likelihood of households selling maize by increasing production of 
higher-value commodities or households’ demand for maize. 
Determinants of Maize Production 
The determinants of maize production for sellers, buyers, and autarkic households are reported in Table 
18. The fit of the models ranges from R
2 = 0.21 for autarkic households to 0.39 for sellers. The selectivity 
correction is significant only in the production model for autarkic households.  
Table 18. Determinants of maize production, dependent variable ln(maize production) 
Sellers Buyers  Autarkic 
Variable  Coefficient Std.  Err.
a  Coefficient Std. Err.
a  Coefficient Std.  Err.
a 
Ln (market price of maize)  0.421** 0.182 0.143 0.162
Ln (value of transportation assets)  0.093 0.149 0.025 0.077
Ln (dist to all weather road)  -0.087 0.118 -0.077* 0.045
Ln (minimum distance to sales market)  0.245** 0.115 -0.181** 0.074
Ln (number of traders known outside PA)  0.078 0.096 0.046 0.061
Member of a cooperative  0.494 0.478 -0.008 0.336
Ln (price of DAP)  0.205 0.893 -0.213 0.496 -0.406 0.385
Proportion of adults in household with 
primary activity (cf. crop producers)  
- Livestock production  -0.450 0.755 0.542 0.489 0.639* 0.366
- Domestic activities  -0.489 0.517 0.051 0.363 0.289 0.242
- Non-farm enterprise  -0.678 1.351 0.524 0.599 0.437 0.654
Proportion of labor force (cf., men) 
- Women  -0.347 0.614 0.563 0.460 0.183 0.391
- Children  -0.288 0.600 0.892** 0.394 0.272 0.384
Male head of household  -0.068 0.294 -0.060 0.223 0.092 0.186
Ln (age of household head)  -0.541 0.499 -0.419 0.381 0.511** 0.219
Ln (total number of workers)  -0.075 0.333 0.282 0.296 0.189 0.264
Ln (area of land operated)  0.693 0.580 0.311 0.404 -0.239 0.196
Member of credit or savings institution 0.242 0.232 0.019 0.188 0.220** 0.110
Primary or secondary education of women  0.155 0.340 -0.603*** 0.226 0.252 0.200
Primary or secondary  education of men  0.043 0.281 -0.100 0.202 0.141 0.158
Land quality characteristics 
Slope of land (cf., flat land) 
- Proportion of land gently sloping  -0.635*** 0.199 -0.323* 0.182 -0.228 0.16766 
Table 18. Continued 
Sellers Buyers  Autarkic 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Err.
a Coefficient Std. Err.
a Coefficient Std.  Err.
a
- Proportion of land steeply sloping  -0.312 0.792 -0.384 0.475 0.524 0.338
- Proportion of land with mixed slopes  -0.012 0.871 0.025 0.422 0.319 0.359
Soil quality 
- Proportion of land with lem soil   0.081 0.354 0.254 0.257 0.191 0.161
- Proportion of land with teuf soil  -1.856 1.313 -0.088 0.787 0.826* 0.486
Agroecology (altitude zone) 
- Proportion of land in dega (high alt.) 
zone -0.350 0.252 -0.967*** 0.220 -0.522*** 0.168
- Proportion of land in woina dega 
(medium) -0.043 0.233 -0.026 0.186 -0.065 0.130
Proportion of land with access to 
irrigation -0.597 1.676 0.193 1.090 0.328 0.609
Proportion of land far from residence  -0.172 0.528 -0.274 0.420 0.272 0.342
Other productive assets 
Ln (value of livestock)  0.052 0.062 0.028 0.041 -0.018 0.031
Ln (value of equipment)  0.105 0.098 0.190** 0.085 0.178*** 0.063
Region (cf., Tigray) 
- Amhara  0.896 0.860 0.549 0.767 -0.481 0.348
- Oromia  0.517 0.609 1.656*** 0.391 0.594** 0.261
- SNNP  0.167 0.634 1.512*** 0.346 0.554* 0.285
Selectivity correction   -1.969 2.380 -0.055 1.898 -1.806*** 0.695
Intercept 2.177 2.960 3.615 3.138 2.263** 0.926
Number  of  observations  383 714 975 
R
2  0.3938 0.3162 0.2085 
a Based on 100 bootstrap replications. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively  
For maize sellers, the factors that statistically significantly influence production include the maize 
market price (+), distance to the nearest market (+), and proportion of land that is gently sloping (–, 
compared to flat land). For maize buyers, the significant factors include distance to the nearest market (–) 
or all-weather road (–-, weakly significant at the 10 percent level), the proportion of children in the 
household labor force (+), education of women in the household (–), proportion of land that is gently 
sloping (–, weakly significant), proportion of land in the dega zone (–), the value of equipment (+), and 
the region (higher in Oromia and SNNP than in Tigray). For autarkic households, significant factors 
include household involvement in livestock production (+, weakly significant), age of household head 
(+), membership in a credit or savings institution (+), proportion of land with teuf soil (+, weakly 67 
significant), proportion of land in the dega zone (–), the value of equipment owned (+), and the region 
(higher in Oromia and SNNP than in Tigray).  
Several factors have similar qualitative impacts on maize production by households taking 
different market positions. Sloping land has a negative impact on maize produced by buyers and sellers, 
high elevation dega land lowers production by both buyers and autarkic households, equipment has a 
positive impact on production by both buyers and autarkic households, and production is higher in 
Oromia and SNNP than in Tigray for both buyers and autarkic households. These results are consistent 
with our expectations. 
Some factors have a significant influence only on households with a particular market position. 
For example, the maize price has a significant positive impact on production by sellers but not by buyers 
(although the coefficient is also positive as expected for buyers). For maize buyers, the proportion of 
children in the household has a positive impact on production, while education of women has a negative 
impact. For autarkic households, the age of the household head and membership in a credit or savings 
institution are associated with greater maize production. None of these findings is inconsistent with the 
theory, but it is not clear why these factors have different impacts on households taking different market 
positions.  
Some findings are inconsistent with the theory: (1) that maize sellers produce more and maize 
buyers produce less the farther they are from a market and (2) that buyers produce less the farther they are 
from a road. According to the theory presented earlier, we expected that factors that increase transaction 
costs such as distance to markets and roads would reduce sellers’ production incentives while increasing 
buyers’ production incentives. Further research is necessary to investigate the robustness of such 
unexpected findings, and if they are robust, to explain them. 
Relative to the unexpected negative impact of access to irrigation on the shadow price of maize, 
discussed in the previous section, we find no evidence that irrigation access has a significant impact on 
maize production. Thus, it appears that if access to irrigation is increasing the shadow price of maize, it 
must be doing so through demand-side impacts (by increasing household incomes and hence the demand 
for maize) rather than by directly affecting maize production. Similarly, the positive impact of 
membership in a credit or savings institution on maize production by autarkic households does not 
explain why such membership has a (weakly) significant positive impact on the maize shadow price, but 
again this could be due to the demand-increasing effects of credit access. Further consideration of such 
demand-side effects, using the regressions for maize sales and purchases (which control for the level of 
production), is presented in the next section. 68 
Determinants of Maize Sales And Purchases 
The determinants of maize sales and purchases are reported in Table 19. Neither model fits the data 
particularly well, especially the model for maize purchases. Nevertheless, several factors are found to 
have statistically significant impacts in that model.  
Table 19. Determinants of maize sales and purchases, nonlinear least squares estimation 
Sales   Purchases  
Variable  Coeff. Std.  error
a  Coeff. Std.  error
a 
Maize production  0.332*** 0.030 -0.217*** 0.038
Ln (market price of maize)  1.2 21.9 165.9* 88.5
Ln (value of transportation assets)  -8.4 16.0 422.1 7659796.0
Ln (dist to all weather road)  7.9 11.4 -468.0** 189.5
Ln (minimum distance to sales market)  -6.8 17.4 233.7* 133.4
Ln (number of traders known outside PA)  -6.2 8.8 310.8** 135.7
Member of a cooperative  -30.2 55.0 2173.0** 894.2
Ln (price of DAP)  -33.3 60.9 2502.3** 1036.0
Proportion of adults in household with primary 
activity (cf. crop producers)  
- Livestock production  56.9 86.9 -2400.0** 1057.5
- Domestic activities  48.8 88.7 -2407.8*** 940.6
- Nonfarm enterprise  73.1 1188.9 -3516.7** 1581.4
Proportion of labor force (cf., men) 
- Women  9.7 71.2 -1588.6** 638.6
- Children  -3.2 65.0 -640.3 407.6
Male head of household  -1.1 37.2 -805.1** 340.3
Ln(age of household head)  33.9 66.2 -2730.2** 1076.0
Ln(total number of workers)  38.2 50.6 -1504.1** 610.0
Ln(area of land operated)  -42.9 64.9 2982.2** 1206.2
Member of credit or savings institution 21.9 18.7 -895.2** 406.0
Primary or secondary education of women  -3.4 30.1 264.7 205.8
Primary or secondary education of men  6.4 27.3 -611.8** 242.3
Land quality characteristics 
Slope of land (cf., flat land) 
- Proportion of land gently sloping  -11.0 25.9 69.3 74.2
- Proportion of land steeply sloping  34.4 73.3 -2455.5 2854.4
- Proportion of land with mixed slopes  36.1 83.6 -2334.8*** 898.1
Soil quality 
- Proportion of land with lem soil   -27.7 32.4 1881.5** 747.7
- Proportion of land with teuf soil  101.5 150.2 -6634.3** 2665.169 
Table 19. Continued 
Sales Purchases 
Variable  Coeff. Std.  error
a  Coeff. Std.  error
a 
Agroecology (altitude zone) 
- Prop. of land in dega (high alt.) zone  -8.4 32.8 265.8* 155.8
- Prop. of land in woina dega (medium)  -14.1 47.1 760.9** 320.4
Prop. of land with access to irrigation 182.8 188.4 -6970.9** 3084.7
Prop. of land far from residence  -0.7 58.1 564.0 522.9
Other productive assets 
Ln(value of livestock) -4.9 5.1 253.1*** 96.9
Ln(value of equipment)  -4.6 11.6 414.4** 169.2
Region (cf., Tigray) 
- Amhara  -63.3 63.5 3400.6** 1421.3
- Oromia  -13.3 62.8 -55.8 134.3
- SNNP  5.3 3241.0 -600.4 372.4
Selectivity correction (σsρps) 200.5 256.1 -12329.1** 4867.0
Intercept (δ0) 227.3 289.2 -11995.3** 5247.6
Number of observations  383  714 
R
2 0.1967  -0.0301 
a Based on 100 bootstrap replications. 
*, **, *** mean the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% levels, respectively. 
As with the model for teff sales (Table 16), the only factor having a statistically significant 
impact on maize sales is maize production. The coefficient of maize production (0.332) in this model 
indicates that an increase in maize production results in an increase of only one-third of that amount in 
maize sales by maize-selling households. This suggests that maize production is a large component of the 
income of such households and that an increase in production substantially increases maize demand.  
An increase in maize production by maize-buying households results in a reduction of maize 
purchases of only 22 percent of the increase in production, again reflecting increased demand for maize as 
a result of increased maize production and income. Other factors significantly affecting maize purchases 
include the distance to the nearest all-weather road (–), the number of traders known outside the PA (+), 
membership in a cooperative (+), the price of DAP (+), the importance of occupations other than crop 
production (–), the proportion of women in the household’s labor force (–), male head of household (–), 
the age of the household head (–), the number of adult workers in the household (–), the area of land 
operated (+), ownership of livestock (+) and equipment (+), membership in a credit or savings institution 
(–), education of men in the household (–), the proportion of land with mixed slopes (–), the proportion of 
land with different soil types (+ for lem soil, – for teuf soil), the altitude zone (+ in the medium-altitude 70 
woina dega zone relative to lower-altitude zones), access to irrigation (–), and the region (greater in 
Amhara than in Tigray).  
Most of these results are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. For example, 
greater ownership of land, livestock, and equipment all contribute to greater maize purchases by 
increasing maize demand, controlling for the level of production; while a larger proportion of women in 
the labor force (likely associated with lower income) is associated with lower maize purchases.
32  A 
higher price of DAP is associated with greater maize purchases, consistent with the theoretical prediction 
discussed in section 2 (if the demand for fertilizer is sufficiently price elastic) (see Table 1). Lower maize 
purchases by households pursuing primary activities other than crop production may be due in part to 
differences in income (if such households earn lower incomes, which may be particularly true for 
households in which domestic activities are more important), or differences in consumption preferences 
by households with different livelihood strategies (may be particularly true for pastoralist livestock 
producers and households specializing in nonfarm activities). Some factors likely influence maize 
purchases by affecting transaction costs; for example, being closer to an all-weather road, knowing more 
traders, or being a member of a cooperative all may increase maize purchases by reducing costs of buying 
maize. 
The effects of some factors are not consistent with the unconstrained credit model but could be 
consistent with the model with binding credit constraints. For example, we find that a larger household 
labor supply is associated with lower maize purchases, which contradicts the predictions of the theoretical 
model with unconstrained borrowing, as shown in Table 1, but it could be consistent with the model with 
a binding credit constraint (in which such impacts are ambiguous), as shown in Table 2. The negative 
impacts of male head of household and male education on maize purchases are also not consistent with 
the unconstrained-borrowing model, assuming that these factors contribute to higher income, but could be 
consistent with the more ambiguous predictions of the credit-constrained model in Table 2. The negative 
impact of membership in a credit or savings institution on purchases also could be consistent with the 
credit-constrained model, assuming that membership in such organizations increases access to credit (see 
the ambiguous impact of credit constraint on purchases in Table 2). 
The negative impact of access to irrigation on maize purchases (controlling for production level) 
is not consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, since access to additional productive assets 
is expected to increase income and hence consumption demand. This is also not consistent with our 
findings in Table 17 showing a positive impact of access to irrigation on the shadow price of maize 
(which we explained as possibly due to demand-increasing effects of irrigation access). We do not have 
an explanation for this puzzling finding.
                                                 
32 Although Tables 1 and 2 show that increasing K is predicted to reduce purchases by food buyers, this is the total effect of 
the increase in K, allowing production to increase. In our regression results, we are controlling for the level of production, so the 
effects on purchases of increasing productive assets in these results are via the impacts on food demand.  71 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper we have developed a theoretical farm household model of food crop production and 
marketing decisions, derived testable hypotheses concerning the determinants of these decisions, and 
tested these hypotheses using data on cereal production and marketing collected from a nationally 
representative household survey in Ethiopia.  
The household model predicts the standard results of three market regimes in the presence of 
variable transaction costs (sellers, buyers, and autarkic households); that reduction in transaction costs 
increases the likelihood of participation in markets and improves the welfare of both sellers and buyers. 
The model predicts that a change in market prices has opposite effects on the welfare of sellers versus 
buyers, but no impact on autarkic households’ welfare, unless the change is large enough to induce them 
to participate in markets (in which case formerly autarkic households’ welfare increases, regardless of 
whether they become sellers or buyers). The model also predicts that a change in variable transaction 
costs has opposite impacts on the production incentives of food sellers versus buyers, with a transaction 
cost decrease increasing sellers’ incentive to produce but reducing buyers’ production incentive.  
The effects of other factors influencing the household supply and demand for food are also 
predicted by the theory. For example, endowments of productive quasi-fixed assets such as land, 
livestock, and equipment are predicted to increase production and the probability and level of food sales 
by reducing the shadow price of food, while higher prices of inputs and higher wage levels are predicted 
to reduce production and sales if credit constraints are not binding. Higher input prices and wages have 
different predicted impacts on consumption and welfare, however, if households are buyers of inputs but 
net sellers of labor (as is common in Ethiopia). Other demand related factors, such as the household’s 
labor endowment and exogenous income are not expected to influence production by market participants, 
if credit constraints are not binding and the labor market functions perfectly, but increases in these factors 
are expected to increase production and consumption by autarkic households by inducing an increase in 
the shadow price of food. The impacts of most factors are more ambiguous if credit is constrained or 
other markets operate imperfectly (such as the labor market), especially for autarkic households.  
The predictions of the theory demonstrate that the factors that increase commercialization do not 
necessarily increase smallholders’ crop production or welfare, and vice versa. For example, an increase in 
the market price increases production and sales by sellers but reduces welfare of buyers, and investments 
in infrastructure or development of market institutions that reduce transaction costs will increase 
production by food crop sellers but reduce production by food crop buyers, as noted above. Similarly, 
lower wage levels tend to promote greater crop production and sales, due to lower costs and lower 
household demand, but they also reduce the welfare of households who are net labor sellers. Hence, if 72 
improving the welfare of rural households is of primary concern, promoting commercialization may not 
always be the most effective way to achieve this, and having too narrow a focus on promoting 
commercialization could be counterproductive. The implications of particular approaches to promoting 
commercialization and trade-offs between the objectives of increasing commercialization and improving 
household welfare should be considered. 
The evidence from the household survey indicating that households hold different market 
positions for teff and maize, the two most important crops for smallholders in Ethiopia, leads to some 
important policy-relevant implications. We find that most producers of teff and maize are either autarkic 
or net buyers of these crops, rather than net sellers (net buying is especially common for maize), and that 
these households are poorer, in many respects, than net sellers. The welfare of both net buyers and 
autarkic households is improved by increases in food productivity and net buyers benefit from reduced 
food prices, while the welfare of autarkic households is either unaffected by price decreases or improved 
if the price decrease is enough to induce them to become net buyers. Therefore, the distributional impacts 
of policies to promote increased cereal production and reduced prices are generally favorable, although 
some net sellers may lose as a result. Coupling this favorable distributional impact with the efficiency and 
economic growth-enhancing impacts of productivity increases strongly supports continued efforts to 
improve foodcrop productivity in Ethiopia. 
Several factors, supported by the theoretical and econometric results of this study, contribute to 
increased production and sales of teff and maize. Improvements in smallholders’ access to roads, land, 
livestock, farm equipment, and social connections with traders were all found to increase production of 
teff and the probability of being a teff seller. Increased teff production was the only factor found to 
significantly increase the level of teff sales by teff sellers. Similarly, improved access to roads, land area 
and quality, and livestock increase the likelihood of maize selling. Maize production is the only factor 
significantly increasing maize sales. These results are consistent with the hypotheses and indicate the 
importance of continued investments in productive infrastructure, assets, and other factors contributing to 
improved cereal productivity, if the government of Ethiopia is to be successful in promoting greater 
commercialization of food crops.  
Not all of our empirical results are consistent with our theoretical hypotheses (especially for the 
model with unconstrained borrowing and a perfect labor market). For example, several factors had 
different and unexpected impacts on teff production by teff buyers than on production by teff sellers; 
including the price of teff, the gender and age of the household head, ownership of farm equipment, 
altitude, and the region. Although the model predicts that factors affecting transaction costs will have 
different impacts on sellers’ and buyers’ production incentives, most of these factors are not clearly 
related to transaction costs. It may be that teff buyers, who may be poorer and more likely to have binding 73 
credit constraints, are more concerned about risk than teff sellers. For example, this could account for the 
negative association between teff price and production by teff buyers, since a higher price implies a 
reduction in real income for teff buyers, which could inhibit their ability or willingness to purchase inputs 
for teff production. Concerns about food insecurity could also cause teff-buying households in Tigray, 
where rainfall is lower and more uncertain than in other regions, or households living at higher elevations, 
to produce more teff than comparable households in other regions, despite lower productivity in these 
areas.  
We also found, contrary to our expectations, that access to irrigation is associated with a higher 
shadow price of maize and that maize sellers produce more the farther they are from a market, while 
maize buyers produce more the closer they are to a market. Some of these unexpected findings may result 
from the effects of access to irrigation and markets on other agricultural crops besides maize and other 
livelihood options. For example, access to irrigation may increase households’ income via increased 
production of higher-value commodities or higher labor demand and wage levels, hence increasing 
households’ demand and the shadow price of maize. Farmers farther from an urban market may have a 
comparative advantage in producing and selling maize relative to high-value perishable crops; hence 
maize sellers who are farther from an urban market may devote more of their land to maize and thus 
produce more. It is less clear why maize production by maize buyers would decline with distance from 
markets. 
Further research is needed to assess these and alternative explanations for such unexpected 
findings. Incorporating the effects of risk, imperfections in labor markets, and alternative crops and land 
uses would be useful directions to take in generalizing the theoretical models developed here and 
explaining the empirical findings. Nevertheless, the finding that several factors can have differential 
impacts on production by households taking different market positions is an important result, 
demonstrating that targeted approaches taking such differences in to account are needed to promote food 
crop production and commercialization among smallholders in Ethiopia. 
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